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Notes
APPLICATION OF THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION FOR THE
ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRAL AWARDS: THERE IS NO
PLACE LIKE "THE HOME" IN SAINT MARY
HOME, INC. v. SERVICE EMPLOYEES
INTERNATIONAL UNION, DISTRICT 1199

I.

INTRODUCTION

The English Courts recognized that public policy "is a very unruly
horse, and.., once you get astride it you never know where it will carry
you." 1 With more and more parties using arbitration as an alternative
means for dispute resolution, the public policy exception to the enforcement of arbitral awards has emerged as a controversial check on the authority of the arbitrator. 2 In turn, what was thought to provide a quick
and cost effective method of dispute resolution has turned full circle and
landed parties back in the courtroom. 3 Courts have recognized the public
policy exception as a valid defense to enforcing arbitral awards, but they
4
differ widely on how to apply the exception properly.
1. Harry T. Edwards, JudicialReview of Labor ArbitrationAwards: The Clash Between the Public Policy Exception and the Duty to Bargain,64 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 3, 20
(1988).
2. See Brad A. Galbraith, Note, Vacatur of Commercial ArbitrationAwards in Federal Court: Contemplating the Use and Utility of the "Manifest Disregard"of the Law Standard, 27 IND. L. REv. 241, 241 (1993) (observing that parties use appellate process
to review arbitrator's interpretation of controversy when disappointed with result).
3. See Ultracashmere House, Ltd. v. Meyer, 664 F.2d 1176, 1179 (lth Cir.
1981) (stating that goal of arbitration is "to relieve congestion in the courts and
provide parties with an alternative method for dispute resolution that would be
speedier and less costly than litigation"); see also Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille,
The Steelworkers Trilogy and Grievance Arbitration Appeals: How the Federal Courts Respond, 13 INDUs. REL. L.J. 78, 79 (1991) (documenting over 1600 federal district
and circuit court decisions involving grievance appeals from arbitration process
since 1960); Galbraith, supra note 2, at 242 (asserting that federal courts in United
States are immensely overcrowded partially due to party dissatisfaction with arbitration process); Bret F. Randall, Comment, The History, Application, and Policy of the
Judicially Created Standards of Review for ArbitrationAwards, 1992 B.Y.U. L. REv. 759,
759 (1992) (commenting that although arbitration was intended to reduce
caseloads within federal court system, arbitral process is actually increasing
litigation).
4. See Stephen L. Hayford, Law in Disarray: Judicial Standardsfor Vacatur of
Commercial Arbitration Awards, 30 GA. L. REv. 731, 731 (1996) (recognizing that
arbitration law is in disarray over both statutory and nonstatutory grounds of vacatur, such as public policy exception); Lewis B. Kaden, Judges and Arbitrators: Observations on the Scope of Judicial Review, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 267, 268 (1980) (noting

(829)
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Although the Supreme Court attempted to establish the scope of the
public policy exception in WI.R Grace & Co: v. Local Union 759, International Union of United RubbeW and United PaperworkersInternationalUnion v.
7
Misco, Inc.,6 the Court did not formulate a bright line rule for applying it.

Subsequently, federal courts have diverged into three different lines of
how to interpret the public policy exception. 8 First, many courts follow
the traditional method of interpreting the public policy exception narrowly, showing great deference to the arbitrator because the parties bargained for an arbitrator's judgment. 9 Second, some circuits have recently
proposed expanding the parameters of the public policy exception to account for general considerations of public welfare. 10 Third and finally,
recent uncertainty in federal courts concerning scope ofjudicial review of arbitral
awards).
5. 461 U.S. 757 (1983).
6. 484 U.S. 29 (1987).
7. See Joseph F. Tremiti, Misco and the Enforcement of Labor ArbitrationAwards:
No Longer a House Divided?, 14 U. DAYTON L. REV.279, 294 (1989) (stating that even
after WR Grace and Misco, "the [Supreme] Court did not specifically answer the
question of when an arbitration award must be set aside on public policy
grounds").
8. For a discussion of the three different interpretations of the scope of the
public policy exception, see infra notes 58-109 and accompanying text.
9. See Edwards, supra note 1, at 3-4 (noting that for arbitration to be effective
there is need for finality). Edwards stated that:
Arbitration provides a relatively speedy, informal and inexpensive alternative to litigation and to economic warfare; it is therapeutic in the sense
that it allows workers to "have their day in court;" it often involves a judgment from someone who is well known and well respected by the parties;
it is a flexible process that easily may be changed to suit the needs of the
parties; and, most importantly, it is an extension of collective bargaining-the private system ofjurisprudence created by and for the benefit of
the parties. However, it has always been understood that, in order to be
fully effective, arbitration must afford finality.
Id.; see DeannaJ. Mouser, Analysis of the PublicPolicy Exception After Paperworkers v.
Misco: A Proposalto Limit the Public Policy Exception and to Allow the Parties to Submit
the Public Policy Question to the Arbitrator,12 INDUS. REL. L.J. 89, 96 (1990) ("Traditionally, the pubic policy exception has been narrowly construed, so that an allegation that an arbitration award violates a community sense of justice or fairness is
insufficient to vacate the award."); Laurie A. Tribble, Note, Vacating Arbitrators'
Awards Under the Public Policy Exception: Are Courts Second Guessing Arbitrator's Deci-

sions?, 38 VILL. L. Rv. 1051, 1051 (1993) (stating that judicial deference reflects
recognition and application of two factors: parties' expressed intent for arbitration
instead of litigation and statutory preferences to have labor disputes settled by
arbitration).
10. See Edwards, supra note 1, at 4 (noting that United States Court of Appeals
for Eighth Circuit adopted expansive interpretation of public policy exception after Misco in Iowa Electric Light & Power Co. v. Local Union 204, InternationalBrotherhood of the Electrical Workers, 834 F.2d 1424 (8th Cir. 1987)). The Seventh Circuit,
First Circuit and Fifth Circuit have also applied a broad interpretation of the public policy exception. See, e.g.,
E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Grasselli Employees
Independent Ass'n, 790 F.2d 611, 612 (7th Cir. 1986) (applying broad interpretation of public policy exception); United States Postal Serv. v. American Postal
Workers Union, 736 F.2d 822, 826 (1st Cir. 1984) (same); Amalgamated Meat Cut-
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adopted a
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has
1
middle ground for the scope of the public policy exception. ]
In Saint Mary Home, Inc. v. Service Employees International Union, District
1199,12 an employer moved on grounds of public policy to vacate an arbitrator's award ordering the reinstatement of an employee whom the em13
ployer discharged for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute.
In its analysis, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
applied the threshold test formulated by the Supreme Court in Misco,
which limits a court's authority to vacate an arbitrator's award on public
policy grounds to "situations where the contract as interpreted would violate some explicit public policy that is well-defined and dominant . . .
[and] ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not
from general considerations of supposed public interest," to determine if
the arbitrator's award violated public policy.' 4 The Second Circuit,
although noting a strong public policy against the use, possession and sale
of an illegal drug, found that the arbitrator's award did not violate public
policy because there was no well-defined and dominant public policy
against the reinstatement of an employee.1 5 The Second Circuit's narrow
reading of the Misco test is questionable in light of how other circuits interpret the scope and application of the public policy exception. 16
This Note discusses the Second Circuit's narrow application of the
public policy exception to the enforcement of arbitral awards in relation
to how other circuits apply the public policy exception. 17 First, Part II
summarizes the scope of judicial review of arbitral awards, the origination
of the public policy exception and the debate in the circuit courts over
how to apply the public policy exception. 18 Second, Part III describes the
ters & Butcher Workmen, Local 540 v. Great W. Food Co., 712 F.2d 122, 123 (5th
Cir. 1983) (same).
11. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's approach to applying the public
policy exception, see infra notes 85-101 and accompanying text.
12. 116 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 1997).
13. See id. at 43.
14. Id. at 45; see United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29,
43 (1987) (noting that arbitrators' awards are to receive great deal of deference to
prevent intrusive judicial review). For a discussion and analysis of the Second Circuit's application of the Misco test, see infra notes 145-70 and accompanying text.
15. See Saint Mary Home, 116 F.3d at 45-47 (stating that arbitral award did not
violate public policy and that, in fact, public policy favored tribunal's flexible approach to reinstating discharged employee). For a discussion of the Second Circuit's interpretation of the scope of the public policy exception in Saint Mary Home,
see infra notes 128-44 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of other circuits' approaches to interpreting the public
policy exception, see infra notes 58-109 and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of the Second Circuit's application of the public policy
exception in Saint Mary Home, see infra notes 12844 and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of the scope of deference that courts allot to arbitral
awards, the origination and recognition of the public policy exception and the
debates over the proper scope of the public policy exception in the various circuits, see infra notes 22-109 and accompanying text.
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relevant facts and legal issues addressed by the Second Circuit in Saint
Mary Home.19 Third, Part IV traces how the Second Circuit interpreted
and applied the public policy exception and analyzes its decision in Saint
Mary Home.2 0 Finally, Part V addresses the likely impact of the Second
Circuit's decision and concludes that the Second Circuit's overly narrow
interpretation of the public policy exception, if followed by other courts
or if maintained as the standard within the Second Circuit, will lead to an
unattainable threshold to applying the public policy exception in cases
where vacating an arbitrator's award on public policy grounds is
2
warranted. '
II.

BACKGROUND:

VACATING ARBITRAL AwARDS THAT VIOLATE

PUBLIC POLICY

A.

Scope ofJudicial Review of Arbitration Awards

A standard collective bargaining agreement between a union and a
company provides for an arbitrator to have the authority to settle any dis22
putes under the agreement between the company and union employees.
23
The Supreme Court in United Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing Co.,
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.2 4 and United Steelworkers
19. For a discussion of the facts and legal issues that the Second Circuit addressed in Saint Mary Home, see infra notes 110-27 and accompanying text.
20. For a discussion of the Second Circuit's decision in Saint Mary Home and
the appropriateness of its determinations regarding the public policy exception,
see infra notes 128-70 and accompanying text.
21. For a discussion of the impact of the Second Circuit's decision in Saint
Mary Home on the public policy exception, see infra notes 171-78 and accompanying text.
22. See David E. Feller, A General Theory of the Collective BargainingAgreement, 61
CAL. L. REV. 663, 689 (1973) (describing collective bargaining agreements). The
Supreme Court has explained that:
A collective bargaining agreement is an effort to erect a system of industrial self government ....
[It] is the means of solving the unforeseeable
by molding a system of private law ....
[An] arbitrator performs functions which are not normal to the courts ....
[and must have qualities

which] the ablest judge cannot be expected to bring ....
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 580 (1960);
see Theodore J. St. Antoine, JudicialReview of Labor ArbitrationAwards: A Second Look
at Enterprise Wheel and Its Progeny, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1137, 1140 (1977) (noting
that "the arbitrator is the parties' officially designated 'reader' of the contract" and
"is their joint, alter ego for the purpose of striking whatever supplementary bargain
is necessary to handle the unanticipated omissions of the initial agreement"). It is
a "well-established principle of American labor law that the grievance-arbitration
process is the chief vehicle for resolving disputes arising from a collective bargaining agreement." Tremiti, supra note 7, at 279; see Warrior & Gulf Navigation, 363
U.S. at 578 ("[A]rbitration is the substitute for industrial strife ....
[A]rbitration
of labor disputes under collective bargaining agreements is part and parcel of the
collective bargaining process itself.").
23. 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
24. 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
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v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,2 5 also known as the Steelworkers Trilogy, in
response to collective bargaining agreements using the arbitration process

to resolve labor disputes, attempted to establish a general proposition that
courts have limited power to review arbitration awards under collective
26
bargaining agreements.
25. 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
26. See Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 599 (stating that parties bargained for arbitrator's interpretation of collective bargaining agreement and "courts have no
business overruling him [or her] because their interpretation of the contract is
different"); American Mfg., 363 U.S. at 567-68 (noting that, when parties have
agreed to submit all of contract's questions to arbitration, court's function "is confined to ascertaining whether the party seeking arbitration is making a claim which
on its face is governed by the contract"); Warrior & Gulf Navigation, 363 U.S. at 585
(holding that issue in question was for arbitrator to determine, not court); see also
Local Union 59, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Green Corp., 725 F.2d 264, 268 (5th
Cir. 1984) (recognizing narrow scope ofjudicial review of arbitral awards instituted
in Steelworkers Trilogy); David E.Feller, FenderBender or Train Wreck?: The Collision
Between Statutory Protection of Individual Employee Rights and the JudicialRevision of the
FederalArbitrationAct, 41 ST. Louis U. L.J. 561, 567 (1997) (acknowledging that, in
commercial arbitration cases under Steelworkers Trilogy, all doubts were to be
resolved in favor of arbitration, avoiding litigation wherever possible); Amy C.
Hodges, The Steelworkers Trilogy in the Public Sector, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 631, 631
(1990) (stating that Supreme Court endorsed use of limited judicial involvement
in arbitration process); Edgar A. Jones, Jr., "HisOwn Brand of IndustrialJustice":The
Stalking Horse ofJudicialReview of Labor Arbitration, 30 UCLA L. REv. 881, 884 (1983)
(arguing that judges should exercise considerable restraint and not interfere with
collective bargaining agreements); James Michael Magee, The PublicPolicy Exception
to JudicialDeferral of Labor ArbitrationAwards-How FarShould Expansion Go?, 39 S.C.
L. REv. 465, 468 (1988) (noting Supreme Court's attempt to flesh out federal common law dealing with collective bargaining arbitration agreements in Steelworkers
Trilogy); Chris Baker, Comment, Sexual Harassment v. Labor Arbitration: Does Reinstating Sexual Harassers Violate Public Policy?, 61 U. CIN. L. REv. 1361, 1365 (1993)
("[F]or the most part federal courts have faithfully adhered to [the Trilogy's] mandate of almost absolute judicial deference to labor arbitral awards."); Maria T.
Roebker, Note, Public Policy Exception to the GeneralRule ofJudicialDeference to Labor
Arbitration Awards: United Paperworkers International Union v. Misco, Inc., 57 U.
CIN. L. REv. 819, 823 (1988) ("In the nearly thirty years since the Trilogy cases
were decided, the general rule of judicial deference to the decisions of labor arbitrators has become a well-established principle that is one of the foremost tenets of
the law of labor arbitration."); Tribble, supra note 9, at 1057 (discussing role of
courts in reviewing arbitrator's decisions under collective bargaining agreements).
Even prior to the Steelworkers Trilogy, courts were reluctant to overturn arbitration awards. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455
(1957) (expressing federal policy that federal court enforcement of arbitration
agreements is best method for obtaining industrial peace). The common law exceptions under which a court could refuse to enforce the arbitrator's award were
limited to: (1) fraud; (2) partiality; (3) misconduct on behalf of the arbitrator; (4)
want of jurisdiction; or (5) gross mistake on the part of the arbitrator. See Magee,
supra, at 466-67 (discussing common law exceptions). Most pre-Trilogy courts at
this time used the "gross mistake" exception because it essentially allowed the
courts to substitute their own opinion and judgment for that of the arbitrator. See
id. (citing Rice v. Southwestern Greyhound Lines, Inc., 244 S.W.2d 245, 249 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1951, writ refd n.r.e.) (setting aside three arbitration awards in which
arbitrator had reviewed evidence and construing collective bargaining clause in
manner finding sufficient cause to discharge arbitrator's award for error)).
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American Manufacturingwas the first Steelworkers Trilogy case that addressed the issue of judicial deference in arbitration disputes. 27 The
Supreme Court, in reversing the decision of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, held that when a collective bargaining agreement provides for the parties to submit all grievances to arbitration, the
function of a court is limited because the parties bargained for the judgment of an arbitrator. 28 As a result, the Supreme Court recognized that
"[w] hen the judiciary undertakes to determine the merits of a grievance
under the guise of interpreting the grievance procedure of collective bargaining agreements, it usurps a function which under that regime is en29
trusted to the arbitration tribunal."
In Warrior & Gulf Navigation, the Supreme Court further emphasized
30
the notion of deference to an arbitrator's award in industrial disputes.
Justice Douglas recognized that arbitration of labor disputes under collective bargaining agreements is "part and parcel" of the agreement process
itself, and the parties' objective in using the arbitration process is primarily
to further their goal of uninterrupted production. 3 1 The Court found
that if a dispute arose and fell within the parameters of the arbitration
32
agreement, it became a question for the arbitrator and not the courts.
Finally, in Enterprise Wheel, the Supreme Court held that the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit should have upheld the
decision of the district court and complied with the arbitral award calling
for the reinstatement of a group of employees who had staged a walk-out
to protest a fellow employee's discharge. 33 In its holding, the Court
34
stressed the importance of judicial deference to the arbitrator's award.
Accordingly, the Court noted that if the arbitrator's award "draws its es-

27. See American Mfg., 363 U.S. at 568 (noting that it was not court's job to
determine whether claim was meritorious).
28. See id. ("The courts.., have no business weighing the merits of the grievance ....

The agreement is to submit all grievances to arbitration, not merely

those which the court will deem meritorious.").
29. Id. at 569.
30. See Warrior & Gulf Navigation, 363 U.S. at 585. Justice Douglas stated that:
The judiciary sits in these cases to bring into operation an arbitral process
which substitutes a regime of peaceful settlement for the older regime of
industrial conflict. Whether contracting out in the present case violated
the agreement is the question. It is a question for the arbiter, not for the
courts.

Id.
31. See id. at 578, 582 (commenting that, in commercial cases, arbitration is
substitute for litigation).
32. See id. at 582 (noting limited role of courts in labor relation conflicts and
stating that orders to arbitrate particular grievances should not be denied unless
"it may be said with positive assurance that an arbitration clause is not susceptible
of the interpretation that covers the asserted dispute").
33. See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593,
599 (1960).
34. See id. at 596. The Enterprise Wheel Court also stated that "[t]his plenary
review by a court of the merits would make meaningless the provisions that the
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sence" from within the boundaries of the collective bargaining agreement,
a court may not choose to vacate the award, even if the court disagrees
with the arbitrator's reasoning, because the parties bargained for the arbi3 5
trator's construction of the agreement.
B.

Origination of the Public Policy Defense

Although the Steelworkers Trilogy provided for a limited scope of judicial review of arbitral awards, federal courts have recognized that there
are exceptional circumstances under which a court may review the award
of an arbitrator. 36 Prior to the Steelworkers Trilogy, few courts, including
the Supreme Court, recognized the public policy defense as an exception
to deny the enforcement of arbitral awards. 37 Beginning in 1983, however, the federal courts recognized the public policy exception as a de38
fense to the enforcement of arbitral awards.
The first case to address the public policy exception in detail after the
Steelworkers Trilogy and which helped lay the framework for the arbitral
process and the exceptions to the enforcement of an arbitrator's award
was Local 453, International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers v.
arbitrator's decision is final, for in reality it would almost never be final." Id. at
599.
35. See id. at 598-99 (denying courts' right to vacate award merely on merits of
case or on arbitrator's construction of agreement).
36. See Gulf Coast Indus. Workers Union v. Exxon Co., 991 F.2d 244, 248 (5th
Cir. 1993) (acknowledging that arbitration awards are not inviolate); Newsday, Inc.
v. Long Island Typographical Union, No. 915, 915 F.2d 840, 844 (2d Cir. 1990)
(recognizing that courts can refuse to enforce arbitral awards if award is contrary
to public policy); Manville Forest Prods. Corp. v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union,
831 F.2d 72, 74 (5th Cir. 1987) (stating that it will not enforce arbitration award
that concerns matters not subject to arbitration under collective bargaining agreement, fails to "draw its essence" from contract or violates public policy).
37. See Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 34-35 (1948) ("The power of the federal
courts to enforce the terms of private agreements is at all times exercised subject to
the restrictions and limitations of the public policy of the United States as manifested in the Constitution, treaties, federal statutes, and applicable legal precedents."); Black v. Cutter Lab., 43 Cal. 2d 788, 808 (1955) (stating that this was not
first time this court was asked to recognize and give effect to public policy where
premises are clear).
38. See United Food & Commercial Workers v. National Tea Co., 899 F.2d
386, 389 (5th Cir. 1990) (acknowledging courts may overrule arbitral awards that
violate public policy); Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n,
625 F.2d 38, 42 (5th Cir. 1983) (stating that courts can only set aside arbitral
awards under limited exceptions: (1) arbitrator misconduct, (2) lack of jurisdiction or (3) repugnancy to superior law or public policy); see also Magee, supra note
26, at 470 (recognizing that different courts have applied public policy defense to
different degrees and that this exception clearly exists under federal law, although
to what extent is hotly debated); Douglas E. Ray, Sexual Harassment, Labor Arbitration and National Labor Policy, 73 NEB. L. REv. 812, 813 (1994) ("Where an issue
dealt with by a labor arbitrator is also covered by public regulation, the arbitrator's
award may be subject to challenge in court on grounds that it allegedly violates the
public policy behind such regulation.").
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Otis Elevator Co.39 In Otis Elevator, the Second Circuit recognized that, in
limited circumstances, the courts could refuse to enforce an arbitrator's
award if it violated public policy. 40 This limited application of the public
policy exception became known as the "traditional approach. ' 4 1
For the twenty years following Otis Elevator, the traditional approach
was the dominant approach followed by the courts. 4 2 Although most
39. 314 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1963). In Otis Elevator, an employee was discharged
following a conviction for possessing gambling slips on his employer's premises
during work hours. See id. at 26. The parties submitted the dispute to arbitration
pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement and the arbitrator found that,
although the employee was guilty of serious misconduct, the company lacked just
cause for his dismissal and ordered reinstatement. See id. at 26-27. On appeal, the
district court determined that the award should not be enforced because it was
contrary to public policy. See id. at 27 (stating that district court found "the award
'indulges crime, cripples an employer's power to support the law, and impairs his
right to prevent exposure to criminal liability"' (quoting Local 431, Int'l Union of
Electrical Workers v. Otis Elevator Co., 201 F. Supp. 213, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 1962))).
The union appealed the district court's determination and the Second Circuit affirmed the arbitrator's award to reinstate the employee. See id. at 29. The Second
Circuit recognized that there was a public policy that condemns gambling by an
employee on the premises of his employer, but there was not a public policy
against the reinstatement of an employee who had been convicted, fined and subjected to serious disciplinary measures after his first offense when there was no
indication that reinstatement would result in repeated offenses. See id.
40. See id. (concluding that while federal law allowed for courts to vacate arbitral awards on public policy grounds, this defense to enforcement of arbitrator's
award is "subject to the restrictions and limitations of the public policy of the
United States"). The Second Circuit, although recognizing that courts can refuse
to enforce arbitral awards that violate public policy, concluded that the plaintiff's
crime was vindicated in the very manner that the State of New York prescribed-by
a criminal conviction and a seven-month layoff without compensation or accrual of
seniority benefits. See id. The Court stated: "The law is not that Draconian. To
enforce the arbitrator's award in these circumstances cannot fairly be looked upon
as judicial condonation of [plaintiffs] offense." Id.
41. See Magee, supra note 26, at 472 (recognizing that while some courts have
read public policy exception in this narrow sense, others have used much broader
interpretations). Compare Otis Elevator, 314 F.2d at 29 (applying narrow interpretation of public policy exception), with Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen, Local Union 540 v. Great W. Food Co., 712 F.2d 122, 123 (5th Cir. 1983)
(holding that award ordering reinstatement of employee for wrecking tractortrailer rig violated public policy and refusing to enforce award).
42. See Kane Gas Light & Heating Co. v. International Bhd. of Firemen &
Oilers, Local 112, 687 F.2d 673, 682 (3d Cir. 1982) (stating that "only if upholding
an award would amount to 'judicial condonation' of illegal acts, should the award
be vacated on grounds of inconsistency with public policy" (citing International
Ass'n of Machinists, Dist. No. 8 v. Campbell Soup Co., 406 F.2d 1223, 1227 (7th
Cir. 1969); Otis Elevator; 314 F.2d at 29)); Perma-Line Corp. v. Sign Pictorial &
Display Union, Local 230, 639 F.2d 890, 895 (2d Cir. 1981) (stating that arbitral
awards can be set aside if contrary to "well accepted and deep rooted public policy"); Campbell Soup, 406 F.2d at 1227 (rejecting public policy attack on award ordering reinstatement without back pay of employee who pleaded guilty to
misdemeanor violation of state gambling laws for taking bets on company premises); see also Magee, supra note 26, at 474 (acknowledging that courts, prior to
1983, predominantly applied traditional approach of public policy exception to
challenges of arbitral awards).
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courts applied this traditional approach to the public policy exception,
these courts failed to set any clear boundaries on the reach of the exception. 43 Nevertheless, using this seemingly "limitist" interpretation, it did

not preclude some courts from applying a more expansive interpretation. 44 It was not until 1983 in WI.R Grace, however, that the Supreme
43. See Arco-Polymers, Inc. v. Local 8-74, 671 F.2d 752, 755 (3d Cir. 1982)
(stating that "courts should not disturb ambiguous, unclear, and even deliberately
opaque arbitration opinions because 'the policy in favor of the peaceful resolution
of labor disputes through arbitration outweighs any damage which arbitration
might cause"' (quoting Amalgamated Meat Cutter Local 195 v. Cross Bros. Meat
Packers, Inc., 518 F.2d 1113, 1120 (3d Cir. 1975))); Banyard v. NLRB, 505 F.2d
342, 347 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (demonstrating that District of Columbia Circuit
equated public policy exception with sanctioning of illegal conduct).
44. See Stephen L. Hayford & Anthony V. Sinicropi, The Labor Contract and
External Law: Revisiting the Arbitrator's Scope of Authority, 1993 J. Disp. RESOL. 249,
267 (1993) (identifying bases for courts to apply their expansive interpretation of
public policy exception). One commentator, noted:
The five triggers to the public policy inquiry ...

are as follows:

1. Circumstances where the grievant's work-related conduct clearly violates, or is inconsistent with, a relevant public policy governing or regulating that work conduct... ;
2. Circumstances where the grievant's conduct has prevented, or could
prevent, the employer from fulfilling its duty under a relevant public policy...

;

3. Awards wherein the arbitrator has reinstated a grievant employee
whose conduct is alleged to have violated public policy without addressing the salient public policy issue ... ;
4. Circumstances where a relevant public policy either expressly bars reinstatement of the grievant employee, by arbitral award or otherwise ... ;
5. Circumstances where positive law, i.e., a clear, unequivocal statutory
or case law directive, prohibits an arbitral order that the grievant employee be reinstated ....
Id.; see Magee, supra note 26, at 474-75 (noting that Ninth Circuit and Illinois and
Texas state courts applied broader interpretation of public policy exception and
clarifying that prior to 1983, although most courts showed extreme deference to
arbitrator's decisions, there were broader interpretations of what violated public
policy).
In fact, the Ninth Circuit, and a few state courts did begin to consider a
broader application of the public policy exception for vacating an arbitrator's
award. See World Airways, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Airline Div., 578
F.2d 800, 803 (9th Cir. 1978) (ruling that reinstatement of pilot to position of
Pilot-In-Command after demotion for repeated errors in judgment, which had
threatened lives of passengers, would violate federal regulations that made it duty
of carrier to determine, in interests of public safety, whether pilot's personal characteristics would jeopardize public safety). The Ninth Circuit, however, later narrowed the scope of the exception in Stead Motors v. Automotive Machinists Lodge No.
1173, 886 F.2d 1200 (9th Cir. 1989), and disapproved of the holding of World Airways. See id. at 1211. In Illinois, in Department of Central Management Service v. American Federation of State, County, & Municipal Employees, 554 N.E.2d 759 (IIl. App. Ct.
1990), prior to being superceded by statute, an arbitrator's award that gave priority
in assigning extra work to a college teachers' union members who participated in
illegal strikes violated public policy and must be vacated, even if the award would
have shown proper regard towards the collective bargaining agreement and the
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Court attempted to clarify the appropriate scope of the public policy ex45
ception to the vacatur of arbitral awards.
C.

W.R. Grace: Debate Over the Application of the Public Policy
Exception Begins

W.. Grace defined the scope and application of judicial review when
a party challenges an arbitral award under a claim of violation of law or
public policy. 46 In W.R. Grace, the Supreme Court held that in reviewing
an arbitration award, a court may not uphold a collective bargaining
agreement that is contrary to public policy. 4 7 The Court cautioned, however, that judicial refusal to enforce an arbitrator's award should be limited to situations in which the contract or collective bargaining agreement
would violate a well-defined and dominant public policy.48 Furthermore,
the Court held that a federal court can not overrule an arbitrator's decision simply because the court believes its own interpretation of the collec49
tive bargaining agreement would be a better one.
The issue that ultimately reached the Court dealt with the enforcement of an arbitration award that provided for back pay damages against
W.R. Grace & Co. under a collective bargaining agreement with Local
intent of the participating parties. See id. at 767; see also Board of Trustees of Community College Dist. No. 508 v. Cook County College Teachers Union, Local 1600,
386 N.E.2d 47, 53 (Il1. 1979) (noting change in application of public policy exception in Illinois). In Texas, in Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Sanford, 540 S.W.2d 478
(Tex. App. 1976, no writ), the court held that an award reinstating an employee to
the same position that he had held prior to his termination and providing that
neither party shall bring a suit or any other action in a court or public administrative agency on any matter of dispute that is subject to the grievance procedures,
until the procedure has been exhausted, violates both state and public policy by
hindering reporting and prosecution of violations of criminal law. See id. at 485
(applying broad approach to public policy exception). Nevertheless, any expansion of the public policy defense prior to the early 1980s was minimal. See Magee,
supra note 26, at 475 (explaining evolution of broader application of public policy
defense for vacating arbitral awards).
45. See Roebker, supra note 26, at 826 (explaining origination of circuit split
regarding application of public policy exception).
46. See Magee, supra note 26, at 491 ("[Clompliance with the requirements of
W.
Grace is a prerequisite to overturning an arbitral award on public policy
grounds.").
47. See W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int'l Union of United Rubber,
461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983) ("If the contract as interpreted ... violates some explicit
public policy, we are obligated to refrain from enforcing it." (citing Hurd v.
Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 35 (1948))).
48. See id. ("Such a public policy.., must be well-defined and dominant, and
is to be ascertained 'by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from
general considerations of supposed public interests."' (quoting Muschany v.
United States, 324 U.S. 49, 66 (1945))).
49. See id. at 757. The court stated that "regardless of what this Court's view
might be of the correctness of the arbitrator's contractual interpretation, petitioner and respondent bargained for that interpretation, and a federal court may
not second guess it. The arbitrator's analysis of the merits of the grievance is entitled to the same deference." Id.
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Union 759 due to court-ordered layoffs the company had made. 50 In discussing the public policy exception, Justice Blackmun, on behalf of a
unanimous Court, stated that courts are required to refuse enforcement of
contracts that are contrary to law and well-defined and dominant public
51
policies.
50. See id. at 764-65. In October 1973, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) found that the company's discriminatory hiring practices involving women and African-Americans were in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17. See id. at 759. Furthermore, the Director of the EEOC found that the departmental and plant-wide seniority systems, mandated by the company's collective bargaining agreement with
the Local Union No. 759, were also unlawful because they perpetuated the effects
of the past discrimination at W.R. Grace. See id. The EEOC gave W.R. Grace the
opportunity to conciliate the dispute pursuant to § 706(b) of the Act. See id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976)). W.R. Grace cooperated with the EEOC and
reached a conciliation agreement that permitted women strike replacements to
exercise shift preference seniority and assigned them positions ahead of certain
men who had been provided greater shift preference under the collective bargaining agreement. See id. at 760. The conciliation agreement also provided that W.R.
Grace would maintain the existing proportion of women in the plant's bargaining
unit in the event of a layoff, while men with greater seniority, who were to be given
preference during layoffs under the collective bargaining agreement, would fall
suspect to layoffs under the conciliation agreement. See id. at 760-61. At the same
time, the collective bargaining agreement entitled the members with longer terms
of service to seniority in the event of a layoff. See id.
The conflict between the conciliation agreement and the collective bargaining agreement arose when the collective bargaining agreement expired and the
failed negotiations between the plaintiff and W.R. Grace resulted in a strike. See id.
at 760. W.R. Grace, in turn, hired strike replacements, some of whom were women, who W.R. Grace retained after the strike participants returned to work. See
id. Upon the return of the strikers, certain male participants with more seniority
were not reinstated to their prior positions and other men, pursuant to the conciliation agreement, were laid off. See id. These affected parties filed grievances. See
id. at 761-62. W.R. Grace refused to participate in arbitration proceedings over
these incidents, stating that they were bound by the conciliation agreement. See id.
at 760. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's ruling that the conciliation
agreement was binding on W.R. Grace and ordered arbitration of the disputes. See
id. at 762.
In arbitration, the arbitrator upheld the strikers' grievances and awarded back
pay based on findings that, even though W.R. Grace was acting under the terms of
the EEOC agreement, the collective bargaining agreement made no allotment for
good faith violations of the seniority provisions. See id. The arbitrator concluded
that W.R. Grace acted at its own risk in breaching the agreement. See id. Dissatisfied with the arbitrator's decision, W.R. Grace instituted an action for vacating the
award, arguing that two public policies-obedience to a court order and favoring
compliance with Title VI-would be undermined if the arbitrator's award would
be enforced. See id. at 766, 770. Justice Blackmun, on behalf of the Supreme
Court, upheld the arbitrator's award, reflecting upon the conflict between deference to the finality of arbitrator's awards and the desire to vacate arbitral awards
for violation of public policy. See id. at 767-71.
51. See id. at 764-65 (upholding policy set forth in Steelworkers Trilogy, that
under well-established standards for review of arbitral awards, federal courts play
limited roles, usually deferring to arbitrator's decision even if decision is ambiguous); see also Edwards, supra note 1, at 10 (noting that in WR. Grace, "the Court's
decision represents nothing 'more or different than what the courts have said over
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Although the Court recognized the importance of the policies in
favor of following judicial orders and complying with Title VII, it found
that the enforcement of the arbitral award would not thwart public policy. 52 The Court held that the enforcement of the arbitrator's award did
not create intolerable incentives to disobey future court orders because it
did not require W.R. Grace & Co. to ignore the district court's order to
comply with the conciliation agreement. 53 Rather, the decision simply allocated losses to an employer that forced itself into this dilemma by volun54
tarily committing to two conflicting contractual obligations.
The WI.R Grace holding provides interested parties with the ability to
invoke the public policy exception in cases where they are dissatisfied with
the award of the arbitrator. 55 This ability has already given rise to many
requests for vacating arbitral awards. 56 Unfortunately, the varying interthe years in construing Enterprise Wheer" (quoting American Postal Workers Union
v. United States Postal Serv., 789 F.2d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 1986))).
52. See W.. Grace, 461 U.S. at 766-71 (finding that enforcement of employee's
award would not adversely affect either policy to comply with court orders or Title
VII). In fact, the Court found that enforcement of the arbitral award in this case
would "encourage conciliation and true voluntary compliance with federal employment discrimination law." Id. at 771. The unanimous Court found that, in this
case, the conciliation process of Title VII and the collective bargaining process
complement each other. See id. at 772.
53. See id. at 769, 771 ("Enforcement of... [the] award will not create intolerable incentives to disobey court orders."). The Supreme Court also found that,
although W.R. Grace and the EEOC agreed to nullify the collective bargaining
agreement, this did not include the union. See id. at 771 (noting that union was
not party to conciliation agreement negotiations). Absent a judicial determination, neither the EEOC nor W.R. Grace can unilaterally alter the collective bargaining agreement. See id. ("Permitting such a result would undermine the federal
labor policy that parties to a collective bargaining agreement must have reasonable
assurance that their contract will be honored." (citing Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974); Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502,
509 (1962))). As a result, the Court found that although the ability to unilaterally
do away with provisions of the collective bargaining agreement may encourage an
employer to conciliate with the EEOC, the employer's added incentive to conciliate would be compensated within the union's contractual rights. See id.
54. See id. at 767 (analyzing aftermath of employer's decisions regarding its
contractual obligations). After discussing the dilemma into which the defendant
had placed itself by entering into two conflicting contractual obligations-the conciliation agreement and collective bargaining agreement-the Court stated:
[N]othing in the collective bargaining agreement as interpreted by Barrett required the Company to violate that order. Barrett's award neither
mandated layoffs nor required that layoffs be conducted according to the
collective bargaining agreement. The award simply held, retrospectively,
that the employees were entitled to damages for the prior breach of the
seniority provisions.
Id. at 768-69.
55. See Roebker, supra note 26, at 830 (interpreting and analyzing impact of
Supreme Court's holding in WR. Grace on future parties who participate in collective bargaining agreements that provide for arbitration).
56. See S.D. Warren Co. v. United Paperworkers' Int'l Union, Local 1069, 815
F.2d 178, 186-87 (1st Cir. 1987) (arguing that requiring arbitral award, which mandated that employer reinstate employees who were discharged for possession of
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pretations of WR. Grace adopted by the circuit courts have resulted in inconsistent application of the public policy exception and controversies
57
concerning the extent to which courts can review an arbitrator's award.
D.

No "Saving Grace ": Three-Way Split Defined

Following the decision in WR Grace, three lines of authority developed regarding a court's authority to set aside arbitral awards for violating
public policy. 58 Several courts, following the broad view of Amalgamated
59
Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen, Local Union 540 v. Great Western Food Co.,

recognizing the court's power to set aside an arbitration award, viewed the
public policy exception as an avenue through which courts could bypass
the traditional judicial deference based upon "common sense" considerations. 60 In comparison, other courts applied a limited scope of review by
marijuana on employer's premises, would violate public policy for drug-free workplace); International Union, UAW 449 v. Keystone Consol. Indus., Inc., 794 F.2d

810, 814-15 (7th Cir. 1986) (contesting that arbitrator's award would violate public
policy, embodied in Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1461 (1994), of protecting plan participants from unnecessary termination of their pension plans); Amalgamated Meat Cutter & Butcher Workmen, Local Union 540 v. Great W. Food Co., 712 F.2d 122, 123-24 (5th Cir. 1983)
(appealing ruling that enforcement of arbitral awards reinstating truck drivers who
were discharged for consuming alcohol on duty violates public policy).
57. See United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 35 n.7
(1987) (comparing application of W.R. Grace in various circuits). The Court in
Misco noted that the First and Seventh Circuits took a broader view of the public
policy exception, while the Ninth and District of Columbia Circuits took a much
narrower view of the public policy exception. See id. (demonstrating split in jurisdictions regarding ability of courts to vacate arbitral awards on public policy
grounds (citing Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 808 F.2d 76,
84 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("But, so long as the Board acts within its jurisdiction and its
awards draw their essence from the collective bargaining agreement, and neither
contravene established law nor require an unlawful act ... [precedent requires]
that such awards be enforced."); Bevles Co., Inc. v. Teamsters Local 986, 791 F.2d
1391, 1393 (9th Cir. 1986) (ruling that arbitrator's decision granting reinstatement
and back pay to two undocumented aliens was not rendered in "manifest disregard
of the law" and thus was not reviewable); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Grasselli Employees Indep. Ass'n, 790 F.2d 611, 617 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding, at time of
case, that award ordering reinstatement of employee who had been discharged
after mental breakdown was enforceable); American Postal Workers Union v.
United States Postal Serv., 789 F.2d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (stating that even if arbitrator's view of law was wrong, decision to exclude grievant's statements did not
violate law or policy or require employer to act unlawfully); United States Postal
Serv. v. American Postal Workers Union, 736 F.2d 822, 826 (1st Cir. 1984), holding
that arbitration award requiring reinstatement of employee who was convicted of
embezzling postal funds was unenforceable for violation of public policy))).
58. For a discussion of courts that have broadly applied the public policy exception, see infra notes 60, 64-72 and accompanying text. For a discussion of
courts that narrowly apply the public policy exception, see infra notes 73-84, 102-09
and accompanying text. For a discussion of the middle ground approach, see infra
notes 85-101 and accompanying text.
59. 712 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1983).
60. See, e.g.,
American Postal Workers Union, 736 F.2d at 825 (refusing to enforce
arbitration award because policies violated by award were "clear dictates of com-
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relying on the Steelworkers Trilogy and Misco and emphasizing the "extreme narrowness" of the public policy exception. 61 The Third Circuit,
mon sense"); Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 712 F.2d at 125 (stating that public policy
against drinking alcohol and driving was embodied in pure common sense). The
broad view of the public policy exception has been applied by the First, Fifth, Seventh and Eighth Circuits. See Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Local Union 204 of
the Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 834 F.2d 1424, 1428-29 (8th Cir. 1987) (ruling that
because nuclear power plant machinist jeopardized public health and safety,
although this is not justification to discharge every employee that violates public
safety regulations, reinstatement of this employee would violate public policy); S.D.
Warren, 815 F.2d at 186 (looking beyond laws against sale and use of drugs, considering "corrosive consequences of drug sale and use" and finding that such activity
is dangerous and constitutes threat to safety of all employees); Keystone Consol.
Indus., 793 F.2d at 818 (refusing to apply waiver provision provided in ERISA when
interpreting annual funding requirement of pension agreement based on collective bargaining agreement); American Postal Workers Union, 736 F.2d at 825-26 (finding that, although there is no specific statute prohibiting postal workers from
stealing, "given its important trust and its mandate of efficiency, it violates public
policy to force the Postal Service to reinstate an employee who was.., convicted of
directly violating his fiduciary duties through the embezzlement of a large sum of
money from it"); Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 712 F.2d at 125 (including common
sense considerations in public policy analysis).
61. See, e.g., Northwest Airlines, 808 F.2d at 78, 83 (describing public policy exception as very limited, stating that it is "extremely narrow" and should only be
applied when public policy emanates from clear statutory case law). The Second,
Fourth, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh and District of Columbia Circuits have
adopted a narrow approach to the public policy exception. See First Nat'l Supermarkets Inc. v. Retail, Wholesale & Chain Store Food Employees Union Local 338,
118 F.3d 892, 897-98 (2d Cir. 1997) (stating that "courts may invoke public policy
to vacate an arbitral award 'only in those rare cases where enforcement of the
award would be directly at odds with a well-defined and dominant public policy
resting on clear law and legal precedent"' (quoting Saint Mary Home, Inc. v. Service Employees Int'l Union, Dist. 1199, 116 F.3d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 1997))); Mountaineer Gas Co. v. Oil Chem. Workers Int'l, 76 F.3d 606, 608 (4th Cir.) (advocating
deference to arbitrator because parties to collective bargaining agreement opted
for arbitrator's interpretation and resolution of their dispute and holding award
must be in "manifest disregard of law" for courts to vacate award), cert. denied, 117
S. Ct. 80 (1996); Bowles Fin. Group v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 22 F.3d 1010, 1012
(10th Cir. 1994) ("To stress the narrowness of our [judicial] review, however, we
look solely to statutory and other legal requirements imposed upon arbitration
contracts, proceedings and awards."); Brown v. Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc., 994
F.2d 775, 782 (l1th Cir. 1993) (noting that courts can vacate arbitral awards as
violating public policy only if policy is well-defined, dominant and drawn from laws
and legal precedent); Seymour v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 988 F.2d 1020, 1023
(10th Cir. 1993) ("If a court is to disturb an award, it can only do so under strict
statutory or judicially-created standards."); Shelby County Health Care Corp. v.
American Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees, Local 1733, 967 F.2d 1091,
1095 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that courts may refuse to enforce arbitral awards
that violate public policy when decisions will clearly violate well-defined and dominant public policy); Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local Union No. 33 v. Power
City Plumbing, 934 F.2d 557, 561 (4th Cir. 1991) ("[A]n arbitration award is final
if the arbitration decision 'draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement."' (quoting United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593, 597 (1960))); Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v.J.V.B. Indus. Inc., 894 F.2d 862,
866 (6th Cir. 1990) (applying "manifest disregard of the law" test for vacatur of
arbitrator's award on public policy grounds); United Food & Commercial Work-
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ers, Local Union No. 7R v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 889 F.2d 940, 946 (10th Cir. 1989)
(stating that courts can vacate arbitrator's award when it "manifest[s] an infidelity"
to arbitrator's obligation to have award draw its essence from collective bargaining
agreement); Stead Motors v. Automotive Machinists Lodge No. 1173, 886 F.2d
1200, 1211 (9th Cir. 1989) (emphasizing narrow view of public policy exception);
Pack Concrete, Inc. v. Cunningham, 886 F.2d 283, 285 (9th Cir. 1989) (deferring
to arbitrator's award if it "draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement"); Apperson v. Fleet Carrier Corp., 879 F.2d 1334, 1353 (6th Cir. 1989)
("[F]ederal courts do not have plenary power to review the merits of an arbitration
decision. Rather, the courts should defer to the agreed upon tribunal's interpretation of the contract 'as long as the award draws its essence from the bargaining
agreement.' (quoting Wood v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 406, 807
F.2d 493, 500 (6th Cir. 1986))); Board of County Comm'rs v. L. Robert Kimball &
Assocs., 860 F.2d 683, 686 (6th Cir. 1988) (stating that power to set aside arbitrator's award on public policy grounds is not broad in scope); Local Joint Executive
Bd. v. Riverboat Casino, Inc., 817 F.2d 524, 526 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that district court's review of arbitral award is limited); United States Postal Serv. v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 810 F.2d 1239, 1241 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (stating that
public policy exception is designed to be narrow to prevent potentially intrusive
judicial review of arbitral awards); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933 (2d Cir. 1986) ("To adopt a less strict standard ofjudicial review [than manifest disregard of the law] would be to undermine our wellestablished deference to arbitration as a favored method of settling disputes when
agreed to by the parties."); Northwest Airlines, 808 F.2d at 83 (providing for extremely narrow interpretation of public policy exception); Bevies, 791 F.2d at 1394
(upholding arbitrator's award unless it is "manifest disregard of the law"); United
States Postal Serv., 789 F.2d at 7 ("Our review of an arbitrator's award is strictly
limited to determining whether the award draws its essence from the contract.");
Orange Belt Dist. Council of Painters No. 48 v. Kashak, 774 F.2d 985, 990 (9th Cir.
1985) ("The only exception to this broad deference justifies reversal of 'an award
which actually violates the law or any explicit, well-defined and dominant public
policy."' (quoting George Day Constr. Co. v. United Bhd. of Carpenters &Joiners,
Local 354, 722 F.2d 1471, 1477 (9th Cir. 1984)); Washington Hosp. Ctr. v. Service
Employees Int'l Union, Local 772, 746 F.2d 1503, 1514 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("An arbitrator's interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement, whether on questions
of substance or of procedure, is entitled to great deference" and award will not be
overturned unless arbitrator's words fail to draw their essence from collective bargaining agreement); George Day Constr. Co. 722 F.2d at 1477 ("[I]f on its face, the
award represents a plausible interpretation of the contract, judicial inquiry ceases
and the award must be enforced."). Recently, the First Circuit has moved to the
narrow interpretation of the public policy exception that the Second and Eleventh
Circuits follow. See Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc. v. Tanner, 72 F.3d 234, 239, 241
(1st Cir. 1995) (holding that courts can vacate arbitral awards only if they are in
'manifest disregard of the law"); Service Employees Int'l Union v. Local 1199 N.E.,
70 F.3d 647, 652 (1st Cir. 1995) (finding that for courts to vacate arbitrator's
award, award must violate well-defined and dominant public policy); El Dorado
Technical Servs., Inc. v. Union General de Trabajadores de Puerto Rico, 961 F.2d
317, 319 (1st Cir. 1992) ("Put succinctly, then, a court should uphold an award
that depends on an arbitrator's interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement
if it can find, within the four corners of the agreement, any plausible basis for that
interpretation."); Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 8-10 (1st Cir. 1990) (applying "manifest disregard of the law" threshold for vacating arbitral awards on public
policy grounds); Georgia-Pac. Corp. v. Local 27, Paperworkers Int'l Union, 864
F.2d 940, 944 (1st Cir. 1988) (stating that court's role in reviewing arbitrator's
decision is very limited); Local 1445, United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l
Union v. Stop & Shop Co., 776 F.2d 19, 21 (1st Cir. 1985) (finding that arbitrator's
decision may be reviewed by courts under public policy exception only if it is in
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however, is the only circuit to adopt a middle road approach in applying
the public policy exception. 62 Ironically, although the Supreme Court in
WR. Grace attempted to clearly define the scope of the public policy exception, its ambiguous decision actually resulted in a three-way circuit
split.

1.

63

Expanding Beyond TraditionalLines of the Public Policy Exception

After the dust cleared from the decision in WR. Grace, the federal
courts had to clarify their own interpretation of the public policy exception. 64 Courts that adopted the expansive view of the public policy exception found that enforcement of an arbitrator's award would be denied "to
65
safeguard public welfare under changing conditions, mores and values."
"manifest disregard of the law"). The Seventh and Eighth Circuits have also generally shifted to a narrower interpretation. See Schiltz v. Burlington N. R.R., 115 F.3d
1407, 1414 (8th Cir. 1997) ("Under narrow circumstances, the public policy
ground disallows the courts to lend their authority to a board decision which
might harm the public."); International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 878 v. Commercial Warehouse Co., 84 F.3d 299, 302 (8th Cir. 1996) (recognizing that courts have
authority to vacate arbitral awards only where award violates well-defined and dominant public policy); Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. United Transp. Union, 23 F.3d 1397,
1399-1400 (8th Cir. 1994) (applying well-defined and dominant public policy
threshold for vacating arbitrator's award on public policy grounds); Ethyl Corp. v.
United Steelworkers, 768 F.2d 180, 183 (7th Cir. 1985) (noting that scope of judicial review is extremely narrow).
62. See Gregory T. Mayes, Labor Law-The Third CircuitDefines the PublicPolicy
Exception to Labor Arbitration Awards-Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen's
Union, 993 .2d 357 (3d Cir. 1993), 67 TEMP. L. Rv. 493, 503 (1994) (defining
Third Circuit test for vacating arbitral award for violation of public policy). The
Third Circuit takes a middle of the road approach to the public policy exception
by applying a two-prong test: (1) does a well-defined and dominant public policy
exist and (2) does the award itself violate a statute, regulation or other manifestation of positive law or compel conduct by an employer that would violate such a
law. See Exxon Shipping Co., 993 F.2d at 360 (applying two-prong test for vacatur of
arbitral awards); Stroehmann Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 776, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters,
969 F.2d 1436, 1442 (3d Cir. 1992) (same).
63. For a further discussion of the three-way circuit split in the application of
the public policy exception and an explanation of how W.. Grace did not clarify
the scope of the public policy exception, see infra notes 64-109 and accompanying
text.
64. See Magee, supra note 26, at 476 (discussing beginning of broader application of public policy exception and noting that expansion had been presaged in
Local No. P-1236, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butchers Workmen v. Jones Daiby Farm,
680 F.2d 1142, 1145 (7th Cir. 1982), and Johns-Manville Sales Corp. v. International
Ass'n of Machinists Local Lodge 1609, 621 F.2d 756, 759 (5th Cir. 1980)).
65. Bernard D. Meltzer, After the Labor Arbitration Award: The Public Policy Defense, 10 INDUS. REL. L.J. 241, 244, 255-56 (1988). After W. Grace, the circuits
were essentially at two ends of a spectrum regarding the public policy exception:
"(1) the expansive or broader view in which enforcement would be denied 'to safe
guard public welfare under changing conditions, mores and values'; and (2) the
'limitist' view that an arbitration award will only be vacated if the award itself is
unlawful or compels unlawful conduct." Eileen Nowikowski, PublicPolicy Exception
to the Enforcement of Labor ArbitrationAwards, 68 MicH. B.J. 626, 626 (1989) (quoting
United States Postal Serv. v. American Postal Workers Union, 736 F.2d 822, 826
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The decision in WR. Grace marked the first time that a federal court
(1st Cir. 1984)); see Northwest Airlines, 808 F.2d at 84 (applying "limitist" view in
enforcing award).
The Fifth Circuit was the first circuit court to examine the scope of the public
policy exception after WI. Grace. See Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen, Local Union 540 v. Great W. Food Co., 712 F.2d 122, 122 (5th Cir. 1983)
(applying public policy exception to enforcement of arbitral awards). Amalgamated
Meat Cutters dealt with an arbitration award ordering an employer to reinstate a
company truck driver with full seniority who was discharged after a traffic accident
when cited for drinking while on duty or within four hours prior. See id. at 123.
Despite the fact that the employee was cited with consuming alcohol within four
hours before going on duty and speeding, the arbitrator ordered the employer to
reinstate the employee with full seniority. See id. In that case, the Fifth Circuit
concluded that the reinstatement of the truck driver would violate the public policy of "preventing people from drinking and driving [that] is embodied in the case
law, applicable regulations, statutory law, and pure common sense." Id. at 125.
The Fifth Circuit cited the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations, 49 C.F.R.
§ 392.5 (1997), as further evidence of this policy. See id. Section 392.5 provides:
(a) No driver shall(1) Use alcohol ... or be under the influence of alcohol, within 4 hours
before going on duty or operating, or having physical control of, a commercial motor vehicle; or
(2) Use alcohol.., while on duty, or operating, or in physical control of a
commercial motor vehicle ....
(b) No motor carrier shall require or permit a driver to(1) Violate any provision of paragraph (a) of this section; or
(2) Be on duty or operate a commercial motor vehicle if, by the driver's
general appearance or conduct or by other substantiating evidence, the
driver appears to have used alcohol within the preceding 4 hours.
49 C.F.R. § 392.5. In Amalgamated Meat Cutters, the Fifth Circuit vacated the arbitrator's award on public policy grounds and started a new trend of adopting an
expanded view of the public policy exception. See Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 712
F.2d at 125; see also Exxon Corp. v. Baton Rouge Oil, 77 F.3d 850, 855 (5th Cir.
1996) (stating that reinstatement of employee who tested positive for cocaine
while occupying safety-sensitive position violated public policy for drug-free society); Gulf Coast Indus. Workers Union v. Exxon Co., 991 F.2d 244, 248-55 (5th Cir.
1993) (overruling arbitrator's award reinstating employee who occupied safety-sensitive position after testing positive for cocaine while on duty because it violated
public policy of prohibiting illicit drugs from workplace).
The next circuit to follow the broad interpretation of the public policy exception, at least temporarily, was the First Circuit. See American Postal Workers Union,
736 F.2d at 824 (disagreeing with Local 453, International Union of Electric Workers v.
Otis Elevator Co., 314 F.2d 25, 29 (2d.Cir. 1963), when it stated that in looking at
"important role which employment plays in implementing public policy of rehabilitating those convicted of a crime, there can hardly be a public policy that a man
who has been convicted, fined, and subjected to serious disciplinary measures, can
never be ordered reinstated to his former employment"). In American Postal Workers Union, the First Circuit dealt with an appeal of an arbitrator's award that ordered reinstatement of a postal worker who embezzled Postal Service funds. See id.
at 823-24. An arbitrator found that the embezzlement of postal funds violated a
federal statute, but after ordering suspension and full restitution, the arbitrator
reinstated the employee because the employee intended to repay the embezzled
money. See id. at 823. Though the First Circuit recognized a well-defined positive
law that would be violated if the employee was reinstated, it focused its justification
for its decision on common sense implications against the employee's reinstate-
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broadly interpreted the public policy exception. 66 By 1984, the United
States Courts of Appeals for the First, Fifth and Seventh Circuits had
adopted a broader application of the public policy exception. 67 Subsequently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit would
68
also apply the broad interpretation of the public policy exception.
In Iowa Electric Light & Power Co. v. Local Union 204 of the International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,69 the Eighth Circuit stated that its decision

to vacate an arbitrator's decision to reinstate an employee who breached a
public safety regulation was not a blanket justification for the discharge of
such employees, but rather a call for a subjective approach in the review of
such arbitral awards, which looks to the severity of the employee's action. 70 In its analysis, the Eighth Circuit considered the common sense
applications of rehiring an employee who showed no respect for the safety
implications of his or her actions and was willing to jeopardize the public
welfare for unjustifiable acts. 71 Although the First, Fifth, Seventh and
Eighth Circuits have adopted the broad interpretation of the public policy

ment. See id. at 825 (rejecting rehiring of employee at different position or supervising employee at current position). Senior DistrictJudge Pettine noted:
We cannot avoid the common sense implications that requiring the rehiring of Cote would have on other postal employees and on the public in
general. Other postal employees may feel there is less reason for them to
be honest than they believed-the Union could always fix it if they were
caught. Moreover, the public trust in the Postal Service, and in the entire
federal government, could be diminished by the idea that graft is
condoned.
Id.
66. See Magee, supra note 26, at 476 (illustrating movement away from traditional interpretation of public policy exception towards broader interpretation,
taking into account general considerations of public policy).
67. For a further discussion of the application of the broad interpretation of
the public policy exception for the enforcement of arbitral awards in the First,
Fifth and Seventh Circuits, see supra note 60 and infra notes 102-09 and accompanying text.
68. See Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Local Union 204 of the Int'l Bhd. of
Elec. Workers, 834 F.2d 1424, 1430 (8th Cir. 1987) (vacating arbitrator's award on
public policy grounds).
69. 834 F.2d 1424 (8th Cir. 1987).
70. See id. at 1429-30 (recognizing that although there are times when safety
violation may be excused, employee's attempt to beat noon rush at nuclear power
plant did not justify defeating safety system to leave).
71. See id. The court noted that "[o]ur decision today is in keeping with the
line of cases vacating arbitrators' awards that direct the reinstatement of employees
whose deliberate acts have jeopardized public health or safety." Id. at 1428 (citing
S.D. Warren Co. v. United Paperworkers' Int'l Union, Local 1069, 815 F.2d 178
(1st Cir. 1987); Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen, Local Union 540
v. Great W. Food Co.; 712 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1983); Local No. P-1236, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butchers Workmen v.Jones Dairy Farm, 680 F.2d 1142 (7th
Cir. 1982)).
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exception since the decision in W.R. Grace, this interpretation remains the
minority view.
2.

72

Deference to Arbitrator: Majority Still Feels That You Should Get What You
Pay For

As the fortieth anniversary of the Trilogy approaches, the conventional wisdom that continues to emerge from these three cases is that arbitral awards should be protected from judicial intervention. 73 Although
lower federal courts have tried to stray from the precedent established by
the Steelworkers Trilogy, the majority of the federal courts have upheld
74
arbitral awards under the Trilogy's protective principles.
Proponents of the limited scope of the public policy exception argue
that courts should not unduly interfere with an arbitrator's decisions in
contract disputes. 75 The essential argument of the traditionalists and
those in favor of deference to an arbitrator's judgment is that the parties
to a collective bargaining agreement that contains an arbitration clause
have bargained for the decision of an arbitrator and not a judge and,
76
therefore, should be bound by the arbitrator's findings.
72. For a further discussion of the narrow application of the public policy
exception, which the majority of the circuits use, see supra note 61, infra notes 7384, 102-09 and accompanying text.
73. See LeRoy & Feuille, supra note 3, at 79 (assessing impact of Trilogy and
noting that in recent years, lower federal courts have been criticized for straying
from principle of judicial deference that Trilogy promulgated).
74. See id. at 83 ("[O]nly a tiny fraction of private sector arbitration awards
(i.e., less than one percent) are appealed to the federal courts, and ... most postarbitration attempts to escape from an arbitrator's ruling are unsuccessful.").
75. See Mouser, supra note 9, at 91 (advocating narrow view of public policy
exception because it protects parties' agreement to have arbitrator resolve dispute
and result is consistent with Supreme Court's emphasis on judicial deference).
76. See Hodges, supra note 26, at 672 (supporting narrow scope of public policy exception). Professor Hodges stated that:
Not only does a broad public policy exception interfere with collective
bargaining policy, but it invites the court to substitute its views as to the
meaning of the contract for those of the arbitrator. Such judicial activism
is directly contrary to the principles underlying the policy favoring arbitration as a method of dispute resolution, and will negate the benefits of
arbitration.
Id.; see Bernard Dunau, Three Problems in Labor Arbitration,55 VA. L. REv. 427, 427
(1969) (stressing importance of finality in arbitration awards and need to limit
judicial review to situations inherent in arbitration process or to instances where
external criteria mandate accommodation); Magee, supra note 26, at 489 (analyzing principles of judicial deference applied in United Paperworkers International
Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36 (1987)); Randall, supra note 3, at 767 (illustrating extreme judicial deference in Second Circuit where "the federal circuits have
erected a virtually insurmountable standard of review. Before a court can review
the propriety of an award, there must be a showing that the arbitrator first correctly ascertained the applicable law and then expressly manifested an intention,
on the record, to disregard it").
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Perhaps the most significant case maintaining this traditional interpretation is Misco.7 7 The Supreme Court in Misco found that the Fifth
Circuit, in vacating the arbitrator's award, "made no attempt to review existing laws and legal precedents, but simply formulated a public policy
against the operation of dangerous machinery while under the influence
7
of drugs based on 'general considerations of supposed public interests.," 8
In concluding that the Fifth Circuit erred in setting aside the arbitral
award on public policy grounds, the Court followed the traditional approach, stating that a court's refusal to enforce an arbitrator's award is
limited to situations where the arbitrator's interpretation violates "'some
explicit public policy' that is 'well-defined and dominant, and is to be ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents.' 79 In following
W.R. Grace, the Court concluded that a court may refuse to enforce a collective bargaining agreement when the specific terms in the agreement
80
violate public policy, but the policy must be clearly shown.
The United States Courts of Appeals for the District of Columbia and
Second Circuits have adopted what appears to be the most narrow application of the circumstances that may enable a court to engage in a Misco or
77. See Roebker, supra note 26, at 831 (discussing impact of Misco, which held
that appellate court could not refuse to enforce arbitrator's award requiring company to reinstate employee who operated hazardous machine and whose company
discharged employee for allegedly violating company rule pertaining to use of marijuana on company property, and finality of arbitral awards with respect to public
policy exception).
78. Misco, 484 U.S. at 31. In Misco, the Supreme Court reversed the decision
of the Fifth Circuit, finding that the court identified no law or legal precedent that
supported an "explicit public policy" against the operation of dangerous machinery while under the influence of drugs. See id. The Court held that even if the
formulation could be accepted, no violation of the policy was even shown because
the connection between the marijuana found in Cooper's car and the actual use of
drugs while in the workplace was tenuous at best. See id. The Supreme Court
found that it was inappropriate for the Fifth Circuit to make this inference because
fact-finding is the task of the arbitrator. See id. Justice White, in delivering the
opinion for a unanimous Court, stated that "' [t] he federal policy of settling labor
disputes by arbitration would be undermined if courts had the final say on the
merits of the awards."' Id. at 36 (quoting United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel
& Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960)).
79. Id. at 31 (quoting W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union, Int'l Union of Rubber
Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983)). Accordingly, the Supreme Court ordered the
employee's reinstatement to his old job or a reasonably equivalent position that
the employee was qualified for because it was not clear whether he would pose a
threat to the contested public policy in every alternative job. See id. at 45.
80. See id. at 43 ("It is clear that our decision ... does not otherwise sanction a
broad judicial power to set aside arbitration awards against public policy."). Justice
Blackmun, with whom Justice Brennan joined, concurred, but wrote separately to
emphasize the narrow grounds on which the decision rested. See id. at 46; see also
Nowikowski, supra note 65, at 626 (stating that Supreme Court in Misco stressed
narrowness of public policy defense); Roebker, supra note 26, at 834 (discussing
limitations of scope of pubic policy exceptions under Misco, where arbitral award
violated well-defined and dominant public policy founded on laws and legal
precedents).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol43/iss4/2

20

Barbakoff: Application of the Public Policy Exception for the Enforcement of

1998]

NOTE

W.R. Grace analysis. 8 1 In addition, the United States Courts of Appeals for
81. See Hayford & Sinicropi, supra note 44, at 265 (commenting on scope of
application of public policy exception for vacating arbitral awards among various
federal circuit courts). The D.C. Circuit has adopted what appears to be the most
narrow application of the circumstances that may enable a court to engage in a
Misco or W. Gracepublic policy analysis. See Hugh D.Jascourt, FederalService Labor
and Employment Law, 5 LAB. LAw. 357, 378 (1989) (noting narrow scope of public
policy exception applied by D.C. Circuit). In fact, since the Great Western case in
1983, the D.C. Circuit has been the only circuit that has openly refused to adopt
the expanded view. See Magee, supra note 26, at 487 (stressing extremely narrow
application of public policy exception by D.C. Circuit and contending that it
makes sense for courts to correct mistakes made by arbitrators, but recognizing
that if public policy exception is to be expanded beyond its traditional scope,
Supreme Court will have to clarify exact parameters of expansion and will have to
provide clear guidelines to lower courts regarding factors that should be considered in applying public policy exception).. The D.C. Circuit followed the interpretation that "an arbitration award may not be enforced if it transgresses well-defined
and dominant laws and legal precedents ....

Thus, the exception applies only

when the public policy emanates from clear statutory or case law." Edwards, supra
note 1, at 13-14. This trigger to the public policy exception recognized by the D.C.
Circuit has been classified as the "positive law" standard. See American Postal
Workers Union v. United States Postal Serv., 789 F.2d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (holding that public policy exception is extremely narrow); see also Northwest Airlines,
Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 808 F.2d 76, 83 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("'Obviously, the
[public policy] exception is designed to be narrow so as to limit potentially intrusive judicial review of arbitration awards under the guise of public policy."' (quoting American Postal Workers Union, 789 F.2d at 8)); Washington-Baltimore Newspaper Guild, Local 35 v. Washington Post Co., 442 F.2d 1234, 1239 (D.C. Cir.
1971) ("[A]n award will not be vacated even though the arbitrator may have made,
in the eyes of judges, errors of fact and law unless it 'compels the violation of law
or conduct contrary to accepted public policy.'" (quoting Gulf States Tel. Co. v.
Local 1692, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 416 F.2d 198, 201 (5th Cir. 1969))). The
"positive law" standard provides that the most extreme deference should be given
to an arbitrator's award under the application of the public policy exception. See
Washington Hosp. Ctr. v. Service Employees Int'l Union, Local 722, 746 F.2d 1503,
1514 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("An arbitrator's interpretation of a collective bargaining
agreement, whether on questions of substance or of procedure, is entitled to great
deference [and] . . . '[t]he federal policy of settling labor disputes by arbitration
would be undermined if courts had final say on the merits of the awards."' (quoting Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 597)); Revere Copper & Brass Inc. v.
Overseas Private Inv. Corp., 628 F.2d 81, 84 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (finding that strong
federal policy in favor of voluntary commercial arbitration, embodied in Federal
Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1-307 (1994), would be undermined if courts intervened in job of arbitrator to hear merits of case).
The Second Circuit has also adopted a narrow approach by applying a test
that allows for arbitral awards to be vacated if they are in "manifest disregard of the
law." See Leed Architectural Prods., Inc. v. United Steelworkers, Local 6674, 916
F.2d 63, 65 (2d Cir. 1990) (" [T]he scope of our review of an arbitration award is
limited ....

This great deference ...

is not the equivalent of a grant of limitless

power.") (citations omitted); Capital Dist. Chapter v. International Bhd. of Painters, Local Union No. 201, 743 F.2d 142, 147 (2d Cir. 1984) (noting that arbitrator's decision is subject only to limited review); Ottley v. Sheepshead Nursing
Home, 688 F.2d 883, 890 (2d Cir. 1982) (same); Local 771, I.A.T.S.E. v. RKO General, Inc. WOR Div., 546 F.2d 1107, 1113 (2d Cir. 1977) (allowing for vacatur of
arbitral award if it is in manifest disregard of law); Parsons & Whittemore Overseas
Co. v. Societe Generale De L'Industrie Du Papier, 508 F.2d 969, 977 (2d Cir. 1974)
(applying manifest disregard for law test for arbitral award); In re Arbitration Be-
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tween Sobel & Hertz, Warner & Co., 469 F.2d 1211, 1213 (2d Cir. 1972) (using
manifest disregard of law test); Office of Supply v. New York Navigation Co., 469
F.2d 377, 380 (2d Cir. 1972) ("[A] court may vacate an award which is the product
of 'manifest disregard' of applicable law."). Manifest disregard is defined as a standard of review that "might be present when arbitrators understand and correctly
state the law, but proceed to disregard the same." See Kenneth R. Davis, When
Ignorance of the Law Is No Excuse: Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, 45 BUFF. L.
REv. 49, 93 (1997) (citing San Martine Compania De Navagacion, S.A. v. Saguenay
Terminals, Ltd., 293 F.2d 796, 800 (9th Cir. 1961)). The Second Circuit took this
definition one step further in stating that "'manifest disregard' implies more than
an error of law. Rather, '[t] he error must have been obvious and capable of being
readily and instantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator."' Id. at 94 (quoting Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker,
808 F.2d 930, 933 (2d Cir. 1986)). The Second Circuit interpreted manifest disregard of the law to mean "that the arbitrator appreciates the existence of a clearly
governing legal principle but decides to ignore or pay no attention to it." Merrill
Lynch, 808 F.2d at 933. Manifest disregard,- as defined by Merrill Lynch, is nearly
impossible to prove because even when an arbitrator deliberately ignores controlling law, the arbitrator will not usually announce his or her other misconduct. See
id. (interpreting manifest disregard test); see also Davis, supra,at 94 (noting difficult
threshold for demonstrating "manifest disregard of the law"). Thus, the Second
Circuit, like the D.C. Circuit, applies a very narrow scope of review to the public
policy exception. See id. ("After centuries of antagonism towards arbitration,
judges have embraced the national policy favoring agreements to arbitrate, if not a
policy promoting arbitration itself. In the hope of fostering a just yet efficient
system, this [manifest disregard] policy substantially removes arbitration from the
oversight of the judiciary.").
The manifest disregard test has drawn both challenges and support from the
other circuits. See id. at 95-101 (analyzing circuit interpretations of manifest disregard test). The First Circuit has adopted a liberal approach to the manifest disregard test, finding that "[in] certain circumstances, the governing law may have
such widespread familiarity, pristine clarity, and irrefutable applicability that a
court could assume the arbitrators knew the rule and, notwithstanding, swept it
under the rug." Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 1990) (ruling
that Advest failed to show that arbitrators inevitably recognized applicable damage
rule).
The D.C. Circuit adopted the broadest possible definition of manifest disregard by allowing for plenary review of legal errors stemming from statutory claims
to honor the intent of the parties to an arbitration agreement. See Davis, supra, at
96 (citing Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1997)).
Other circuits, like the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, have rejected the manifest disregard test. See id. at 97 (citing R.M. Perez & Ass'n v. Welch, 960 F.2d 534, 539 (5th
Cir. 1992) (declining to adopt manifest disregard test); Robins v. Day, 954 F.2d
679, 684 (11th Cir. 1992) (openly rejecting manifest disregard test)); see also O.R.
Sec., Inc. v. Professional Planning Ass'n, Inc., 857 F.2d 742, 746-47 (1 1th Cir. 1988)
(refusing to adopt manifest disregard test)). The Eighth Circuit has also refrained
from adopting the manifest disregard test. See Marshall v. Green Giant Co., 942
F.2d 539, 550 (8th Cir. 1991) (concluding that arbitrator may have erred, but deciding manifest disregard test was not met due to inadvertent, rather than intentional, error by arbitrator). Circuits opposed to the manifest disregard test find
that the test fails to provide a measure of review of error in arbitration awards
because it does not take into account the magnitude, quality or consequences of
the error and, most significantly, the manifest disregard test contradicts the implicit intent of the parties to allow for review of the arbitrator's award. See Davis,
supra, at 99-101 (showing that some courts still support deference to decision of
arbitrator instead of applying manifest disregard test). Illustrating the reason
many other circuits have refused to adopt the "manifest disregard" standard, the
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the Fourth, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have also traditionally applied the public policy exception narrowly. 82 These circuits,
Eleventh Circuit stated that: "'[t]his court has never adopted the manifest-disregard-of-the-law standard; indeed, we have expressed some doubt as to whether it
should be adopted since the standard would likely never be met when the arbitrator provides no reasons for its award (which is typically the case)."' Galbraith,
supra note 2, at 254 (quoting Raiford v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 903 F.2d 1410, 1412 (l1th Cir. 1990)).
82. See SFIC Properties, Inc. v. International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace
Workers, Local Lodge 311, 103 F.3d 923, 924 (9th Cir.) (finding scope of review of
arbitral award in labor dispute extremely narrow); Mountaineer Gas Co. v. Oil,
Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union, 76 F.3d 606, 608 (4th Cir.) ("[A]bsent any
fraud by the parties or dishonesty by the arbitrator, an arbitrator's findings should
never be overturned." (citing Misco, 484 U.S. at 38)), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 80
(1996); United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l Union, Local 558 v. Foster Poultry Farms, 74 F.3d 169, 173 (9th Cir. 1995) ("'The scope of review of an arbitrator's
decision is extremely narrow."' (quoting Federated Dep't Stores v. United Food &
Commercial Workers Union, Local 1442, 901 F.2d 1494, 1496 (9th Cir. 1990)));
Bowles Fin. Group, Inc. v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., Inc., 22 F.3d 1010, 1012 (10th Cir.
1994) ("To stress the narrowness of our review, however, we look solely to statutory
and other legal requirements imposed upon arbitration contracts, proceedings
and awards."); Brown v. Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc., 994 F.2d 775, 782 (11th Cir.
1993) (ruling that public policy exception allows for courts to vacate arbitral
awards if contrary to well-defined and dominant public policy ascertained by laws
and legal precedents); Seymour v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 988 F.2d 1020, 1023
(10th Cir. 1993) ("If a court is to disturb an award, it can only do so under strict
statutory or judicially-created standards."); Monroe Auto Equip. Co. v. UAW, Local
878, 981 F.2d 261, 269 (6th Cir. 1992) (ruling that award must violate some explicit public policy); Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. Transportation Communications Int'l Union, 973 F.2d 276, 278 (4th Cir. 1992) ("'The
effectiveness of any pro-arbitration policy is dependent, in the first instance, on a
limited scope of judicial review of the arbitrator's determination."' (quoting
United States Bulk Carriers, Inc. v. Arguelles, 400 U.S. 351, 360 (1971))); Shelby
County Health Care Corp. v. American Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees,
Local 1733, 967 F.2d 1091, 1095 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that award must violate
well-defined and dominant public policy, and that conflict between public policy,
and arbitration award must be clearly shown); Interstate Brands Corp. v. Chauffeurs, Teamsters, Warehousemen & Helpers Local Union No. 135, 909 F.2d 885,
892 (6th Cir. 1990) (finding that court's refusal to enforce arbitrator's award is
limited to situations when award would violate well-defined and dominant public
policy); Federated Dep't Stores, 901 F.2d at 1496 (holding that scope of review of
arbitrator's award is extremely narrow (citing Misco, 484 U.S. at 36-37 )); Stead
Motors v. Automotive Machinists Lodge No. 1173, 886 F.2d 1200, 1212 (9th Cir.
1989) (noting Ninth Circuit's narrow view of judicial power to vacate arbitral
award on public policy grounds); Pack Concrete, Inc. v. Cunningham, 866 F.2d
283, 285 (9th Cir. 1989) (allowing for extremely narrow judicial review of arbitrator's award); Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local No. 359 v. Arizona Mechanical
& Stainless, Inc., 863 F.2d 647, 653 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that judicial scrutiny
of arbitrator's award is extremely limited and award is to receive deferential review
if it finds support from collective bargaining agreement); Board of County
Comm'rs v. L. Robert Kimball & Assoc., 860 F.2d 683, 686 (6th Cir. 1988) (finding
that court's refusal to enforce arbitrator's award is limited to situations when award
would violate well-defined and dominant public policy); Florida Power Corp. v.
International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local Union 433, 847 F.2d 680, 681-82 (11th
Cir. 1988) (noting that federal courts traditionally have given deference to arbitral
awards); Butterkrust Bakeries v. Bakery Workers Int'l Union, Local No. 361, 726
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although not insisting upon as stringent requirements as the District of
Columbia and Second Circuits, follow the rule that for an arbitrator's
award to be vacated, it must violate a well-defined and dominant public
policy.8 3 These circuits note that because parties have bargained for the
arbitrator's decision, under the historical construction of the public policy
exception in labor cases, courts must defer to the award of the arbitrator
84
unless the award fits within this extremely narrow application.
3.

Middle Road: The Third Circuit Stands All Alone on the Road Least
Traveled

Although WR. Grace defined what most commentators had interpreted to be two lines of authority in response to the issue of when a court
may set aside arbitration awards that violate of public policy, the Third
Circuit recently has developed a two-prong test, which places it in the middle of this public policy continuum.8 5 The first prong of the Third Circuit's test requires a court to identify a well-defined and dominant public
policy that is expressed or implied by a regulation or statute. 86 The second prong of the test requires a court to consider whether the arbitration
award violated the identified public policy and, also, whether the award
87
would undermine the stated purpose behind the policy.
F.2d 698, 699 (11 th Cir. 1984) (finding that judicial review of arbitration awards is
necessarily very restricted).
83. See Hayford & Sinicropi, supra note 44, at 261-66 (discussing circuits that
apply narrow scope of review to vacate arbitration awards on public policy
grounds); Mouser, supra note 9, at 108-16 (noting circuits that apply narrow approach to public policy exception).
84. See Brown, 994 F.2d at 782 (finding that courts should defer to arbitrator
unless award violates well-defined and dominant public policy); United Food &
Commercial Workers, Local Union No. 7R v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 889 F.2d 940,
948 (10th Cir. 1989) (noting that ability of courts to apply public policy exception
to arbitrator's award is permissible only when award violates explicit public policy
that is well-defined and dominant).
85. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen's Union, 993 F.2d 357, 362-64
(3d Cir. 1993) (illustrating Third Circuit's new two-prong intermediate test); see
also Thomas E. Claps, Labor Law-ArbitrationAwards-An ArbitrationAward Reinstating Helmsman Who Tested Positive for Marijuana Use May Be Vacated for Contravening
PublicPolicy Against the Operation of Sea Vessels by Drug Users-Exxon Shipping Co. v.
Exxon Seamen's Union, 24 SETON HALL L. REv. 541, 542 (1993) (analyzing Third
Circuit's two-prong test for vacating arbitral awards for violation of public policy);
Hayford & Sinicropi, supra note 44, at 271 ("The mid-point of the public policy
trigger is defined by the opinions of the Third Circuit in Stroehmann Bakeries and
Exxon Shipping.").
86. See Mayes, supra note 62, at 494 (interpreting application of Third Circuit
test for vacating arbitral awards on public policy grounds).
87. See Exxon Shipping, 993 F.2d at 364 (holding that reinstating Foster would
"undermine the regulations' stated purpose 'to minimize the use of intoxicants by
merchant marine personnel and to promote a drug-free and safe work environment"' (quoting 46 C.F.R. § 16.101(a) (1997))); see also Mayes, supra note 62, at
494 (describing Third Circuit's two-prong test).
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The first case to apply this middle road test was Stroehmann Bakeries,

Inc. v. Local 776, InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters.8 8 In Stroehmann Bakeries, the Third Circuit faced an action challenging an arbitration award
ordering the reinstatement of an employee charged with sexual harassment. 89 In affirming the decision of the district court, the Third Circuit
applied its two-prong test to determine its ability to vacate the decision of
the arbitrator on public policy grounds. 90 Under the first prong of the
test, the court concluded that there was a well-defined and dominant public policy against sexual harassment in the workplace. 9 1
The Third Circuit, in applying the second prong of the test, found
that the reinstatement of the employee, without an actual determination
that the harassment did not occur, violated public policy. 92 The Third
Circuit found an award that reinstated an employee under these circumstances did not discourage sexual harassment and,' in addition, undermined the employer's ability to fulfill its obligations to prevent and

88. 969 F.2d 1436 (3d Cir. 1992).
89. See id. at 1437-38. The employee, a "store door" driver who was employed
by Stroehmann for 17 years, was discharged for violating a company rule that prohibits immoral conduct while on duty. See id. at 1439. The employee, after unloading his delivery, picked up an orange and asked the night clerk of one of
Stroehmann's customers if her breasts were as hard as the orange. See id. The
employee then attempted to pull up the night clerk's shirt, and he accused the
night clerk of following him so that she could "look at his ass." See id. The employee then grabbed the night clerk's breasts. See id. Next, he told her not to tell
her father of the incident because he did not want to jeopardize his friendship
with her father. See id. After the employee denied the incident to his supervisor,
the sales activator and manager of Stroehmann still discharged the employee for
violating the longstanding written Stroehmann policy prohibiting immoral conduct while on duty. See id. The employee filed a grievance over the discharge
under the collective bargaining agreement between Stroehmann and the Teamsters Union. See id. The arbitrator found that the employee was not discharged for
just cause and ordered his reinstatement with back pay less interim earnings. See
id. at 1440. The district court vacated the award, concluding that there exists a
well-established public policy against sexual harassment in the workplace and that
the award violated this public policy. See id. The Teamsters Union appealed. See

id.
90. See id. at 1441-43 (discussing rationale for vacating arbitrator's award
based on two-prong test).
91. See id. at 1441 (relying on Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994)). The court also concluded, in addition to the public policy against sexual harassment in the workplace, a well-defined and dominant public policy existed favoring voluntary employer prevention and imposition of
sanctions against sexual harassment in the workplace. See id. at 1442.
92. See id. The investigation of the incident did not produce conclusive evidence that the incident occurred and the arbitrator held that Stroehmann had
insufficiently investigated the incident before discharge. See id. at 1440. The Third
Circuit did not agree, however, with the premise that due to the lack of clear determination that the incident actually occurred, they would have to rule in favor of
the employee as the arbitrator did. See id. at 1442.
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sanction sexual harassment in the workplace. 93 Accordingly, the Third
Circuit vacated the arbitrator's award and concluded that reinstatement of
an employee without a determination of the merits of an allegation of
94
sexual harassment violates public policy.
The Third Circuit also applied this two-prong test in Exxon Shipping
Co. v. Exxon Seamen's Union.9 5 In Exxon Shipping, the employer challenged
an arbitration award reinstating a helmsman whom the employer had terminated for testing positive for marijuana after his ship ran aground. 96 In
affirming the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the
employer and vacating the arbitrator's award, the Third Circuit applied
the two-prong test to determine if the arbitrator's award violated a well97
defined and dominant public policy.
The Third Circuit concluded that the Coast Guard regulations express a "well-defined and dominant" public policy against the operation of
a vessel while under the influence of drugs. 98 In applying the second
93. See id. (concluding that award failed second prong of two-prong test by
violating well-defined and dominant public policy and purpose behind public
policy).
94. See id.
95. 993 F.2d 357 (3d Cir. 1993).
96. See id. at 358. Exxon tested an employee for drugs and alcohol under
both the Coast Guard regulation and Exxon's Alcohol and Drug Use Policy after
the employee ran a 635-foot oil tanker aground. See id. Because the Coast Guard
and Exxon use two different screening levels, the employee took two sets of tests.
See id. The employee tested negative at the Coast Guard screening level, but tested
positive at the stricter Exxon level. See id.
Finding the employee's positive test results to violate its drug use policy, Exxon terminated his employment. See id. Exxon's drug policy was contained in its
collective bargaining agreement, under which the Union filed a grievance protesting the employee's discharge. See id. at 359. Although the arbitrators found
that the employee violated the drug use policy, they concluded that termination
was an excessive penalty. See id. The arbitration board ordered Exxon to reinstate
the employee without back pay and to test the employee for drugs once a year. See
id. The drug use policy prohibited the use, possession, distribution or sale of nonprescription drugs while conducting business for Exxon or on Exxon premises and
provided that testing positive is grounds for disciplinary action, including dismissal. See id. The arbitrators found no evidence that the employee possessed drugs
while conducting Exxon business or on Exxon premises and, therefore, assessed
the lesser penalty of suspension. See id. Upon appeal by Exxon to the United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey, the court held that the arbitration board's reinstatement violated a strong public policy against having "drug
users operate commercial vessels," condoned illegal activity and would insufficiently deter drug use by other employees with safety-sensitive jobs. See id. at 360.
The Union appealed to the Third Circuit for reversal of the arbitration board's
award. See id. at 358.
97. See id. at 360-64 (deciding first if well-defined and dominant public policy
existed and second if arbitrator's award violated policy, rules or purposes behind
policy).
98. See id. at 361-62 (relying on language of Coast Guard regulations and Congress' decision to authorize Coast Guard to oversee and ensure maritime safety).
The court noted that the Coast Guard regulations are part of a broader public
policy against the operation of common carriers while under the influence of
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prong of the test, the court found that an award reinstating the helmsman
would violate the public policy of protecting the public and environment
against the operation of common carriers by drug users and would undermine the stated purpose of the regulation- to minimize the use of drugs
and alcohol by merchant marine personnel and to promote a drug-free
and safe work environment.99 As a result of the award failing to satisfy the
second prong of the test, the Third Circuit affirmed the vacatur of the
arbitrator's award on public policy grounds. 100 Although the Third Circuit failed to accept either the narrow approach, that to vacate the arbitrator's award it must violate a "positive law," or the broad approach, that a
court can set aside an arbitrator's award if it is "inconsistent with some
significant public policy," the Third Circuit recognized a new test falling
somewhere between the two boundaries. 10 1
4.

First, Seventh and Eighth Circuits: Lost in the Shuffle

Several circuit courts are having difficulty finding concrete, limiting
principles when applying the public policy exception. 10 2 This is particularly true in the First, Seventh and Eighth Circuits. These circuits previously interpreted the public policy exception broadly, but now, in light of
the confusion following WI.R Grace, they have adopted a more narrow
approach.103
drugs or alcohol. See id. at 361. The Third Circuit also enumerated a long list of
cases that gave further evidence of this public policy. See id. (providing additional
support for conclusion that there existed "a well-defined and dominant public
policy").
99. See id. at 364. The Third Circuit also found that reinstating the employee
would "thwart the achievement of the overriding interest in public safety furthered
by the regulations." Id. These regulations were to discourage drug and alcohol
use by commercial vessel operators, reduce the potential for marine casualties relating to drug and alcohol use and enhance the safety of the maritime transportation industry. See id. The Third Circuit also held that reinstating the employee
would be inconsistent with the public policy expressed in other cases that vacated
awards reinstating operators of common carriers discharged for drug or alcohol
use. See id. (citing Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 861 F.2d 665,
674 (lth Cir. 1988); Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen, Local
Union 540 v. Great W. Food Co., 712 F.2d 122, 124 (5th Cir. 1983)).
100. See id. at 368.
101. See United Transp. Union Local 1589 v. Suburban Transit Corp., 51 F.3d
376, 381 (3d Cir. 1995) (mandating that public policy must be well-defined and
dominant and rejecting "violation of public law" standard (citing Exxon Shipping,
993 F.2d at 363; Stroehmann Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 776, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters,
969 F.2d 1436, 1441 (3d Cir. 1992))); see also Service Employees Int'l Union Local
36 v. City Cleaning Co., 982 F.2d 89, 92 (3d Cir. 1992) (recognizing that arbitral
award must violate "well-defined and dominant public policy"); United States Postal Serv. v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 838 F.2d 146, 150 (3d Cir. 1988)
(rejecting "positive law" threshold test for public policy exception).
102. See Edwards, supra note 1, at 20 (illustrating difficulties that certain circuits encounter in applying public policy exception).
103. See Schiltz v. Burlington N. R.R., 115 F.3d 1407, 1414 (8th Cir. 1997)
(applying test that to vacate arbitrator's award on public policy grounds, it must
violate well-defined and dominant public policy); International Bhd. of Teamsters,
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These circuits have made it nearly impossible for their district courts
to establish a "proper" test concerning the scope of the public policy exLocal 878 v. Commercial Warehouse Co., 84 F.3d 299, 302 (8th Cir. 1996) (same);
Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc. v. Tanner, 72 F.3d 234, 239, 241 (1st Cir. 1995) (ruling
that judicial review of arbitration award is extremely narrow and is available only
where arbitrators have imposed award in manifest disregard of law); Service Employees Int'l Union v. Local 1199 N.E., 70 F.3d 647, 651-52 (1st Cir. 1995) (stating
that federal court review of arbitral decisions on matters of contract interpretation
is extremely narrow and noting that courts can vacate award on public policy
grounds only when it is contrary to well-defined and dominant public policy);
Painewebber, Inc. v. Argon, 49 F.3d 347, 350 (8th Cir. 1995) (rejecting broad interpretation of public policy based on public safety adopted earlier in Iowa Electric
Light & Power Co. v. Local Union 204 of InternationalBrotherhood of Electrical Workers,
834 F.2d 1424 (8th Cir. 1987), and adopting well-defined and dominant public
policy threshold for vacating arbitral awards on public policy grounds delineated
in WR. Grace); Baravati v.Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 706 (7th Cir.
1994) ("A number of courts, including our own, have said they can set aside arbitral awards if the arbitrators exhibited a 'manifest disregard of the law."' (citing
Health Servs. Management Corp. v. Hughes, 975 F.2d 1253, 1267 (7th Cir.
1992))); United Pac. R.R. Co. v. United Transp. Union, 23 F.3d 1397, 1400 (8th
Cir. 1994) (applying well-defined and dominant public policy test for vacatur of
arbitral awards under public policy exception); National Wrecking Co. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 731, 990 F.2d 957, 961 (7th Cir. 1993) ("In order
for a federal court to vacate an arbitration award for manifest disregard of the law,
the party challenging the award must demonstrate that the arbitrator deliberately
disregarded what the arbitrator knew to be the law to reach a particular result.");
Hughes, 975 F.2d at 1267 (applying "manifest disregard" of law standard and stating
that to vacate award under this standard, court must find "something beyond and
different from mere error in law or failure on the part of the arbitrators to understand or apply the law; it must be demonstrated that the majority of arbitrators
deliberately disregarded what they knew to be the law to reach the result they
did"); Chrysler Motors Corp. v. International Union, Allied Indus. Workers, 959
F.2d 685, 687 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that to vacate arbitrator's award, it must
violate well-defined and dominant public policy); Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard
Line, Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding that vacatur of arbitral
awards is extremely narrow and limited to circumstances where arbitrator evidences "manifest disregard for law"); Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 8-10 (1st
Cir. 1990) (applying "manifest disregard test" of Second Circuit and stating that
"to vacate an arbitration award, 'there must be some showing in the record, other
than the result obtained, that the arbitrators knew the law and expressly disregarded it"' (quoting O.R. Sec., Inc. v. Professional Planning Assoc., Inc., 857 F.2d
742, 747 (11th Cir. 1988))); Sheet Metal Workers Local Union No. 20 v. Baylor
Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc., 877 F.2d 547, 551 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that
for courts to vacate arbitrator's award under public policy exception, award must
violate well-defined and dominant public policy); Daniel Constr. Co. v. Local 257,
Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 856 F.2d 1174, 1181-82 (8th Cir. 1988) (same); Stroh
Container Co. v. Delphi Indus., Inc., 783 F.2d 743, 749 (8th Cir. 1986) ("[A]n
arbitrator's conclusions on substantive matters may be vacated only when the
award demonstrates a manifest disregard of the law where the arbitrators correctly
state the law and then proceed to disregard it .... ); Local 1445, United Food &
Commercial Workers Int'l Union v. Stop & Shop Co., Inc., 776 F.2d 19, 21 (1st Cir.
1985) (holding that courts may vacate arbitral award when decision was: "(1) unfounded in reason and fact; (2) based on reasoning so palpably faulty that no
judge, or group ofjudges, ever could conceivably have made such a ruling; or (3)
mistakenly based on a crucial assumption that is concededly a non-fact").
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ception. 10 4 While it is hard enough to place the circuits' application of
the public policy exception on a continuum, these courts have failed to
establish a uniform test within their circuits. 105 As a result of this confusion, arbitration, although intended to reduce federal court caseloads, is
10 6
actually generating litigation.
These circuits' inconsistencies in applying the public policy exception, although somewhat troublesome for both the parties and the courts,
demonstrate the impact that the public policy exception has on the arbitral process.1 0 7 A particular circuit's scope of the public policy exception
104. See Edwards, supra note 1, at 20-23 (summarizing inconsistencies in application of public policy exception by Eighth Circuit (citing Iowa Elec. Light & Power,
834 F.2d at 1429 ("[O]ur holding today should not be read as a blanket justification for the discharge of every employee who breaches a public safety regulation in
a nuclear power plant."))); see also Randall, supra note 3, at 759 ("The proper standard of review of arbitration awards continues to be a puzzle to litigants, and to
some extent to the judiciary."); Tribble, supra note 9, at 1055-56 (acknowledging
conflicts among circuits as to when arbitrator's award is contrary to public policy).
105. See Hayford & Sinicropi, supra note 44, at 267-71 (recognizing unsettled
state of public policy exception and attempting to define parameters for classifying
circuits' position on continuum for application of public policy exception). The
First Circuit has yet to define principles for applying the public policy exception.
Compare Service Employees Int'l Union, 70 F.3d at 651-52 (stating that award can be
vacated on public policy grounds only when award is contrary to well-defined and
dominant public policy), with Prudential-BacheSec., 72 F.3d at 239-41 (ruling that
judicial review of arbitration award is available only when arbitrators have imposed
award in manifest disregard of law), and Advest, 914 F.2d at 8-10 (applying "manifest disregard test" and stating that "to vacate an arbitration award, 'there must be
some showing in the record, other than the result obtained, that the arbitrators

knew the law and expressly disregarded it"' (quoting O.A Sec., 857 F.2d at 747)).
The Seventh Circuit has had difficulty determining the proper scope of the public
policy exception. Compare Sheet Metal Workers, 877 F.2d at 551 (holding that for
courts to vacate arbitrator's award under public policy exception, award must violate well-defined and dominant public policy), with Chicago Newspaper Publishers'
Ass'n v. Chicago Web Printing Pressmen's Union No. 7, 821 F.2d 390, 397 (7th Cir.
1987) (applying "manifest disregard of the agreement" threshold for vacating arbitrator's award on public policy grounds). The Eighth Circuit has also failed to find
a uniform test for applying the public policy exception. Compare Union Pac. R.R.,
23 F.3d at 1400 (applying well-defined and dominant public policy threshold for
allowing vacatur of arbitrator's award under public policy exception), with Stroh
Container, 783 F.2d at 749 (finding that arbitrator's award may be vacated only
when award demonstrates manifest disregard of law).
106. See Edwards, supra note 1, at 3 (noting that long-standing policy ofjudicial deference to arbitration process has been undermined by unwarranted judicial
activism under guise of public policy); LeRoy & Feuille, supra note 3, at 117-19
(documenting vast litigation following Trilogy and noting that toil over scope of
pubic policy exception has seen that Trilogy deference remains alive and well, but
finding some erosion due to application of public policy exception to promote
public interests); Randall, supra note 3, at 759 (tracing problems with arbitral process to ongoing struggle between federal policy of recognizing finality of arbitral
awards through absolute judicial deference and responsibility of courts to protect
general public interest through support of public policies).
107. See Tremiti, supra note 7, at 279, 293 (recognizing split in authority concerning public policy exception and noting tremendous impact and ramifications
of Misco on enforcement of arbitral awards).
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can directly influence the enforcement of an arbitrator's award.' 0 8 The
Supreme Court's decisions in WI.R Grace and Misco, in their attempt to
provide a clear line on the applicability of the public policy exception,
have confused the application of the exception and created a "Darwinist"
struggle between the survival of the arbitrator's award and the public policy exception that can vacate such an award. 109
III.

SAV-T

MAfRY HOME INc. v SERVIcE EMPLOYEES
UNON, Ds7icr 1199

ArrfLR.NA TIONAL

Ted Barron was an employee of the Saint Mary Home, Inc. ("Home")
for over eighteen years. 110 As a nurse's aide for the Home, Mr. Barron was
represented by District 1199 ("Union") under the Home's collective bargaining agreement.'' This case concerns the defendant's discharge of
11 2
Mr. Barron.
108. See Davis, supra note 81, at 52 (discussing dichotomy of outcomes that
may arise when courts attempt to vindicate pubic policy by correcting erroneous
arbitral awards or when courts exercise judicial deference and preserve arbitral
awards to recognize policy of finality of bargained-for arbitral awards).
109. See Mouser, supra note 9, at 103 (noting different applications of Misco in
handling of pubic policy exception); Nowikowski, supra note 65, at 626 (concluding that Misco Court's attempt to resolve split in authority that remained after W.R
Grace left issue of applying public policy exception to arbitral awards as amorphous
as before).
110. See Brief for Appellant at 6 & app. 80, Saint Mary Home, Inc. v. Service
Employees Int'l Union, Dist. 1199, 116 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 1997) (No. 96-9353).
Saint Mary Home ("Home") provides long-term care to approximately 300 residents, and as a skilled nursing facility, the Home is regulated by both the State of
Connecticut and the federal government. See id. at 3. The Home relies on its
certified nurses aides to provide feeding, bathing and other direct care to its residents. See id.
111. See id. The relevant provisions under the collective bargaining agreement provide:
1.
A grievance .. .which has not been resolved .. .may, within ten
(10) working days after the completion of ... the grievance procedure,
may be referred for arbitration by the Home or the Union to an arbitrator selected in accordance with the American Arbitration Association ....
2.
The request for arbitration shall set forth the nature of the grievance and shall state what provisions of this Agreement are claimed to be
[involved].
4.
The opinion and award of an arbitrator hereunder shall be in writing and the award shall be final, conclusive and binding upon the Home,
the Union and the Employees.
5.
The arbitrators shall have jurisdiction only over disputes concerning grievances as defined in Section 1 of Article XXVI [that is, a dispute
concerning interpretation, application, performance, termination or
breach of the agreement] and he shall have no power or authority to add
to, subtract from, or modify in any way the terms of the Agreement.
Saint Mary Home, Inc. v. Service Employees Int'l Union, Dist. 1199, 116 F.3d 41,
43 (2d Cir. 1997).
112. See Saint Mary Home, 116 F.3d at 43.
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On March 18, 1994, Mr. Barron had an argument during work hours
with one of his coworkers, Ms. Green, over the care of one of the residents. 113 The argument became physical, which resulted in Ms. Green
suffering a sprained wrist. 114 Shortly after the scuffle, the Home called
the police, who later arrested Mr. Barron on assault charges.1 15 During a
search incident to arrest at the station, the police found that Mr. Barron
possessed a four and one-half inch bag containing approximately threequarters of an ounce of marijuana, several empty plastic bags, plastic
tweezers and a small gram-type scale.' 1 6 After the search, local prosecutors charged Mr. Barron with assault in the third degree and possession of
marijuana with the intent to distribute. 1 7 Following the investigation of
the incident, the Home discharged Mr. Barron.118
Following Mr. Barron's discharge, the Union invoked the arbitration
procedure of the collective bargaining agreement between the Union and
the Home, contending that the Home did not discharge Mr. Barron for
113. See id. at 42. On March 18, 1994, Mr. Barron was working the 7:00 a.m.
shift at the Home on the West wing. See Brief for Appellant at app. 66, Saint Mary
Home (No. 96-9353). Mr. Barron was working with another Certified Nurses Assistant, Lucille Green, and a dispute broke out over who would serve breakfast to a
particular resident, Grace Collins, who was assigned to Ms. Green. See id. The
resident often preferred Mr. Barron to serve her even though there was no clear
practice of assigning a nursing assistant to residents for meal purposes. See id. On
the morning of the incident, Ms. Green told Mr. Barron that she wished to serve
all of his residents, including Ms. Collins. See id. at 66-67.
114. See Saint Mary Home, 116 F.3d. at 42. Each party asserted that they had
possession of the meal tray, which the other party attempted to remove. See Brief
for Appellant at app. 67, Saint Mary Home (No. 96-9353). The parties did not dispute, however, that Mr. Barron then grabbed the wrist of Ms. Green, causing Ms.
Green to suffer a sprained wrist that required a splint for approximately six weeks.
See id.
115. See Saint Mary Home, 116 F.3d at 42. The police interviewed both Mr.
Barron and Ms. Green, subsequently charged Mr. Barron with assault and removed
him to the West Hartford Police Station. See Brief for Appellant at app. 67, Saint
Mary Home (No. 96-9353).
116. See Saint Mary Home, 116 F.3d at 42. Based on the inventory found during the search incident to arrest, the officer conducted a strip search of Mr. Barron, which revealed a smaller bag of marijuana in his socks and some empty plastic
bags. See Brief for Appellant at app. 67, Saint Mary Home (No. 96-9353). The police
officer, based on his experience and training, concluded that Mr. Barron was dealing marijuana. See id.
117. See Brief for Appellant at app. 67, Saint Mary Home (No. 96-9353). Following the arrest, the prosecutor reduced the drug possession charge to only possession of marijuana. See Saint Mary Home, 116 F.3d at 43. Mr. Barron entered an
accelerated rehabilitation program pursuant to Connecticut state law, which, upon
completion of the probationary term, results in the dismissal of all charges and the
expungement of the charges from the participant's record. See id.
118. See Saint Mary Home, 116 F.3d at 43. The Home informed Mr. Barron of
his discharge in a letter dated April 17, 1994, stating that "[t]ermination, effective
April 27, 1994, is due to your involvement in an incident with another employee of
the Home and due to your being found to be in possession of marijuana. Each of
these incidents independently would have warranted your termination." Brief for
Appellant at app. 68, Saint Mary Home (No. 96-9353).
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cause.' 19 On November 23, 1994, after a hearing, the arbitrator found
that the Home did not discharge Mr. Barron for cause and ordered his
reinstatement, but without back pay or lost benefits. 120 Thus, the arbitrator effectively found just cause to suspend Mr. Barron for seven months
12 1
without pay or benefits.
On December 12, 1994, instead of reinstating Mr. Barron within the
ten day mandate of the arbitrator's award, the Home moved the United
States District Court for the District of Connecticut to vacate the arbitrator's award on two grounds: first, that the award was beyond the authority
of the arbitrator under the collective bargaining agreement; and second,
that the award was contrary to public policy.1 2 2 On September 24, 1996,

23
the district court granted the Union's motion to confirm the award.'
Nevertheless, the Home did not reinstate Mr. Barron and, subse124
quently, the Union moved to hold the Home in contempt of court.
The district court denied the motion and ordered Mr. Barron's immediate
reinstatement. 125 The Home appealed to the United States Court of Ap-

119. See Saint Mary Home, 116 F.3d at 43 ("[A]fter the grievance procedure
failed to resolve the dispute, the Union invoked the [collective bargaining agreement's] binding arbitration provision ....
").In accordance with the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement, the American Arbitration Association appointed
an arbitrator to hear this grievance. See Brief for Appellant at 4, Saint Mary Home
(No. 96-9353). At the arbitration proceedings, Mr. Barron did not testify about the
marijuana or drug dealing paraphernalia in response to the police officer's testimony and showed no remorse about having either the drugs or the paraphernalia
at work. See id. at 5. Furthermore, Mr. Barron did not even claim to have been
rehabilitated. -See id. The Home did not attempt to explain, however, why possession of drugs was injurious to its business or patients. See id. at app. 70.
120. See Saint Mary Home, 116 F.3d at 43. The arbitrator rejected the Union's
characterization of Mr. Barron's incident as "mere possession" of marijuana and
found that the evidence clearly showed that Mr. Barron was dealing drugs. See
Brief for Appellant at 5, Saint Mary Home (No. 96-9353). The arbitrator even concluded that Mr. Barron was in possession of marijuana with intent to distribute,
which is a serious violation warranting discharge. See id. The arbitrator still found,
however, that the Home did not have just cause to terminate Mr. Barron. See id.
The arbitrator essentially looked to two factors to determine that Mr. Barron
should be reinstated: (1) the fact that the State of Connecticut elected not to place
Mr. Barron in jail, but rather in an accelerated rehabilitation program; and (2) Mr.
Barron's record at the Home of over 18 years of employment without any prior
disciplinary problems of this nature. See id. at 6 & app. 80.
121. See Saint Mary Home, 116 F.3d at 43.
122. See id. The Union then proceeded to make an alternative motion to confirm the award. See id.
123. See id. The district court denied the Home's motion to vacate the arbitral award because it found that "[t]here is no public policy against reinstating an
employee who has been convicted of a crime." Brief for Appellant at 6, Saint Mary
Home (No. 96-9353). The district court rejected the Home's argument that the
arbitrator failed to conform to the submission of the parties and that his award
failed to "draw its essence from the labor agreement." See id.
124. See Saint Mary Home, 116 F.3d at 43.
125. See id. The district court denied the Home's motion for stay pending
appeal and as of oral argument, the Home still had not reinstated Mr. Barron. See
id. at 43-44.
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peals for the Second Circuit on the same two grounds asserted in the dis12 6
The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district
trict court.

court on both counts, finding that the award was within the arbitrator's
authority under the collective bargaining agreement and that it did not
12 7
violate public policy.
IV.
A.

ANALYSIS

Saint Mary Home, Inc. v. Service Employees International Union,
District 1199: Narrative Analysis

In Saint Mary Home, the Second Circuit faced two important issues
regarding the public policy exception to the enforcement of an arbitral
award. 128 The first issue that the court addressed was whether an arbitrator's award ordering the reinstatement of an employee of a skilled nursing
facility, whom the facility had discharged for possession of marijuana with
intent to distribute, was beyond the arbitrator's authority under the collective bargaining agreement.1 29 Second, the court had to decide whether
126. See id. at 44.
127. For a discussion of the Second Circuit's analysis of the issue of whether
the arbitrator's award violated public policy, see infra notes 128-44 and accompanying text. For a critical analysis of the Second Circuit's application of the public
policy exception and its enforcement of the arbitrator's award, see infra notes 14570 and accompanying text.
128. See Saint Mary Home, 116 F.3d at 44.
129. See id. The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut
found that the arbitrator did not exceed his authority under the collective bargaining agreement in ordering the reinstatement of Mr. Barron after he was charged
with possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. See id. at 47. On appeal, the
Second Circuit confirmed the arbitrator's reinstatement. See id. The Second Circuit disposed of the Home's argument challenging the authority of the arbitrator
by stating that "[t]he decision of an [arbitrator] hearing . . .a dispute receives
limited review: 'as long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying
the contract and acting within his scope of authority, that a court is convinced that
he committed error does not suffice to overturn his decision."' Id. at 44 (quoting
United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987)). The
court primarily focused its analysis on whether the arbitrator's award "draws its
essence from the collective bargaining agreement." See id. (applying test formulated in United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960)).
The court instituted a narrow scope of review concerning the arbitrator's award
because the parties bargained for the arbitrator's decision. See id. Furthermore,
the court stated that when an arbitrator "'explains his [or her] conclusions in
terms that offer even a barely colorable justification for the outcome reached, confirmation of the award cannot be prevented by litigants who merely argue, however persuasively, for a different result.'" Id. (quoting Andros Compania Maritima
v. Marc Rich & Co., 579 F.2d 691, 704 (2d Cir. 1978)). The Home, in acknowledging the narrow scope of review of the arbitrator's award, argued that the arbitrator
exceeded his authority by ordering the reinstatement of an employee charged with
a type of marijuana offense that is "so serious that any employee may be properly
expected to know without notice that such conduct is offensive and clearly punishable by discharge." Id. (citing Brief for Appellant at app. 78, 80, Saint Mary Home
(No. 96-9353)). The court found that the Home had just cause to discipline Mr.
Barron, but not to discharge him, for the following reasons: (1) Mr. Barron's 18
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the arbitrator's award ordering the reinstatement of the discharged em1 30
ployee violated public policy.
1.

The Scope of the Public Policy Exception

The Home's second challenge to the arbitrator's reinstatement order
was that the award "violates the well-defined and dominant public policy
against possession, sale and distribution of illegal drugs, a public policy
1 31
The Second Circuit
that is exceedingly important in the workplace."
acknowledged that under a general doctrine rooted in common law principles, a court may refuse to enforce a contract that violates a law or public
policy. 13 2 The court noted that its authority to refuse to enforce an arbitral award on public policy grounds is limited due to a "firmly-established,
legislative-entrenched policy favoring the resolution of labor[-management] disputes through arbitration."] 33 Although the Second Circuit recyears of employment at the Home; (2) the absence of any disciplinary problems in
his work history; (3) Mr. Barron's willingness to undergo rehabilitation; and (4)
the fact that the state chose Mr. Barron as a candidate for its accelerated rehabilitation program. See id. The court found that in providing a "colorable justification"
for the award, the arbitrator acted within its broad authority under the collective
bargaining agreement and that its decision may not be upset by a court "simply
because it deems the decision incorrect." Id. The Second Circuit also refused to
overturn the arbitrator's award based on the Home's argument that the arbitrator
exceeded its authority by considering Mr. Barron's postdischarge activities, specifically the accelerated rehabilitation program, in formulating its award. See id. at 45.
The court found that the arbitrator provided sufficient justification for its determination by referring to several predischarge mitigating factors without a reference
to the postdischarge factors. See id. Finally, the Second Circuit noted that if the
parties wanted to set a policy that participating in one or more crimes would automatically provide just cause for dismissal, the parties could have instituted such a
provision in the collective bargaining agreement, which would have limited the
arbitrator's discretion. See id. Instead, the court explained that the parties left the
determination of just cause to the arbitrator, and it is not the job of the courts to
second guess the arbitrator and rewrite the collective bargaining agreement because one party is no longer satisfied with the terms of the agreement. See id. This
Note will only address the second issue in Saint Mary Home. Therefore, the Note's
text will not include discussion of the authority of the arbitrator under the collective bargaining agreement to order the reinstatement of an employee charged with
possession of marijuana with intent to distribute.
130. See id. at 45.
131. Brief for Appellant at 18-19, Saint Mary Home (No. 96-9353). "'There are
countless statutes, regulations, company guidelines, and judicial decisions that pronounce the emphatic national desire to eradicate illicit drugs from the workplace."' Id. (quoting Gulf Coast Indus. Workers Union v. Exxon Co., 991 F.2d
244, 250 (5th Cir. 1993)).
132. See Saint Mary Home, 116 F.3d at 45 (relying on Newsday, Inc. v. Long Island Typographical Union, No. 915, 915 F.2d 840, 844 (2d Cir. 1990)).
133. Id. (citing Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 596). The Second Circuit stated
that its authority to refuse to enforce an arbitral award is limited "'to situations
where the contract as interpreted would violate some explicit public policy that is
well-defined and dominant .. .ascertained by reference to the laws and legal
precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interests."' Id.
(quoting Misco, 484 U.S. at 43).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol43/iss4/2

34

Barbakoff: Application of the Public Policy Exception for the Enforcement of

1998]

NOTE

863

ognized the strong public policy of eradicating the use, possession and
sale of illegal drugs, the court held that the existence of the policy did not
extend to prohibit an arbitrator's award that reinstated an employee who
was arrested for an on-the-job drug-related offense and who had already
134
undergone rehabilitation and suspension without pay.
2.

Applicability of the Public Policy Exception

The Second Circuit noted that, although the material presented by
the Home evinces a strong public policy against the possession, sale and
distribution of illegal drugs, it does not support the narrower public policy
that is at issue here-a policy against reinstatement of a long-term employee who has already completed a rehabilitation program and suffered a
seven-month suspension without back pay and benefits.' 35 Although the
Home offered many cases supporting public policies against drug and alcohol use in safety-sensitive positions in their argument against the reinstatement of Mr. Barron, the court found these cases unpersuasive
because in these cases, the violated public policy was much clearer than
13 6
the public policy currently at issue.
134. See id. (disagreeing with emphasis placed on policy by Home). The
Home suggested that a public policy exists against drug-related material in general
and is embedded in legislative, regulatory and judicial material that favors permanent discharge of an employee who has engaged in drug-related conduct. See Brief
for Appellant at 18-20, Saint Mary Home (No. 96-9353) (citing 21 U.S.C. § 841
(1994) (establishing offenses and penalties for unlawful drug-related acts); Drug
Free Workplace Act of 1988, 41 U.S.C. §§ 701-707 (1994) (applying to workplace
in particular); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 21a-277 (1994) (providing penalties for illegal
manufacture, distribution, sale, prescription and dispensing of dependency-producing drugs); Exec. Order No. 12564, 3 C.F.R. §§ 224-229 (1986), reprinted in 5
U.S.C. § 7301 (1994) (promoting drug-free workplace); 10 C.F.R. §§ 707.1-707.17
(1996) (establishing drug testing program for civilian employees of Department of
Energy); 49 C.F.R. §§ 40.1-40.39 (1995) (establishing drug testing program for civilian employees of Department of Transportation); 48 C.F.R. §§ 923.570-923.5703 (1995) (providing drug testing regulations for Department of Energy)).
135. See Saint Mary Home, 116 F.3d at 46 ("Nowhere does the Home point to
an established policy that calls for a fixed disciplinary action of permanent dismissal in all cases where drug related conduct occurs in the workplace."). The court
noted that it does not need to look further than Connecticut's resolution of Mr.
Barron's case with a period of probation followed by eradication of the record of
arrest, which would allow Mr. Barron to seek future employment without disclosing the incident. See id. (noting that public policy for drug-related conduct in
workplace is "flexible and remedial").
136. See id. at 46-47 (referring to Union Pacific Railroad v. United Transportation
Union, 3 F.3d 255 (8th Cir. 1993), for finding of specific federal regulations proscribing use or possession of drugs by employees and requiring employers to take
action upon discovery of violations); Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen's
Union, 993 F.2d 357, 360-62 (3d Cir. 1993) (requiring employers to take action
against employees found in possession of drugs); Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line
Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 861 F.2d 665, 668, 671-73 (11th Cir. 1988) (noting specific federal regulations and state laws that prohibit operation of any aircraft while still
under influence of alcohol).
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The Second Circuit also found the Home's reliance on Newsday, Inc.

v. Long Island Typographical Union, No. 915137 to be "misplaced."1 3 8 In distinguishing Newsday, the Second Circuit noted that the repeat sexual offender in that case had already been reinstated once following a previous
sexual harassment incident. 139 Furthermore, following the first offense,
the arbitrator warned the employee that any further sexual harassment
episodes would result in grounds for immediate discharge. 140 Therefore,
the Second Circuit concluded that the circumstances of the two cases were
14
distinguishable. 1
Finally, the court found it significant that the Home failed to cite a
single case or regulation that specifically prohibited the reinstatement of
health care employees who were suspended and convicted of drug offenses. 14 2 Also, the court found it equally surprising that the Home did
not attempt to equate the employee's responsibilities to those of a physician, medical technician or any other person in a safety-sensitive position.14 " Accordingly, the Second Circuit affirmed the arbitrator's award
reinstating Mr. Barron after suspension without pay and benefits and held
that the arbitrator's award did not violate a "'well-defined and dominant'
144
public policy."

B.

CriticalAnalysis

The primary issue discussed by the Second Circuit in Saint Mary Home
was whether an arbitral award calling for the reinstatement of an employee charged with possession of marijuana with intent to distribute while
137. 915 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1990).
138. See Saint Mary Home, 116 F.3d at 47 (distinguishing case at hand from
Home's reliance on Newsday). The court in Newsday affirmed the district court's
vacatur of an arbitrator's reinstatement award on public policy grounds in favor of
an employee with a history of sexual harassment. See Newsday, Inc. v. Long Island
Typographical Union, No. 915, 915 F.2d 840, 845 (2d Cir. 1990) (affirming district
court's grant of Newsday's motion for summary judgment to vacate arbitrator's
award).
139. See Saint Mary Home, 116 F.3d at 47 (commenting on Second Circuit's
analysis in Newsday). The court noted that the Second Circuit's vacatur of the first
arbitrator's award in Newsday ultimately had the effect of affirming the first arbitral
award. See id.
140. See Newsday, 915 F.2d at 843 (finding that offenses did not constitute
grounds for immediate discharge).
141. See Saint Mary Home, 116 F.3d at 47.
142. See id. (noting its surprise because health care industry is one of most
heavily regulated industries in country).
143. See id. (commenting on shortcomings in Home's argument).
144. See id. The court stated that in light of the facts of the case at hand,
"were we to vacate the arbitral award we would be doing so in contravention of the
well-established and dominant public policy supporting the validity of arbitral
awards based on our view of 'general considerations of supposed public interest."
Id. (quoting United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 43
(1987)).
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on duty violates public policy. 14 5 The court correctly applied the public
policy test formulated in Misco, limiting the court's authority to refuse to
enforce an arbitral award on, public policy grounds to circumstances
where the collective bargaining agreement would violate a "well-defined
and dominant public policy."1 46 The Second Circuit, however, in finding
that there was no public policy against the reinstatement of an employee
found in possession of marijuana with intent to distribute while on duty,
14 7
took a far too narrow approach to the public policy exception.
1.

Violation of Public Policy: Determination on How Clear the Policy Is
Depends on Who Is Reading the Chart

The Second Circuit incorrectly applied the public policy determination in Misco by concluding that for the arbitrator's award to violate public
policy, there must be a well-defined and dominant public policy against
the reinstatement of an employee found in possession of drugs with intent
to distribute. 1 48 In Misco, the Supreme Court found that the award reinstating an employee operating "dangerous machinery" while under the influence of drugs did not violate public policy because the Fifth Circuit
made no attempt to review existing laws and legal precedent in formulat145. See id. at 45-47; see also Misco, 484 U.S. at 42 (recognizing that it is court's
job to determine if arbitrator's award violates public policy); W.R. Grace & Co. v.
Local Union 759, Int'l Union of United Rubber, 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983) (finding
that question of whether award violates public policy is one for courts to decide
because courts may not enforce collective bargaining agreements that are contrary
to public policy); Newsday, 915 F.2d at 844 ("[The question of whether an award
violates public policy] is a specific application of the more general doctrine,
rooted in the common law, that a court may refuse to enforce contracts that violate
law or public policy.").
146. See Misco, 484 U.S. at 45 (noting that public policy must be ascertained by
reference to laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of
court-determined public interests).
147. See Saint Mary Home, 116 F.3d at 47 (affirmingjudgment of district court
reinstating employee found in possession of marijuana with intent to distribute);
see also Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen's Union, 993 F.2d 357, 367 (3d Cir.
1993) (holding that reinstating employee to safety-sensitive position who had been
terminated after testing positive for marijuana after running oil tanker aground
violated strong public policy, against having drug users operate commercial vessels); Gulf Coast Indus. Workers Union v. Exxon Co., 991 F.2d 244, 257 (5th Cir.
1993) (finding that arbitrator's award mandating reinstatement in safety-sensitive
position of employee who tested positive for cocaine violated "well-defined and
dominant public policy" when United States promotes drug-free and alcohol-free
workplace); Monroe Auto Equip. Co. v. UAW, Local 878, 981 F.2d 261, 269 (6th
Cir. 1992) (ruling that arbitration award ordering reinstatement of employee, who
was discharged by employer for violating employer's drug use policy through offduty marijuana use, did not violate public policy because arbitrator did not find
employee to be impaired or intoxicated while performing his duties).
148. See Saint Mary Home, 116 F.3d at 46 ("While this material evinces a strong
public policy against the use, possession and sale of drugs, it does not support the
narrower public policy the Home seeks to invoke: a policy against the reinstatement of a long term employee . . . [arrested] for possession with intent to sell
marijuana.").
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ing a well-defined and dominant public policy.149 Misco provided no basis
for the overly narrow interpretation of the public policy exception, that
150
the Second Circuit applied in this case.
The Third Circuit in Exxon Shipping, the Fifth Circuit in Gulf Coast
Industrial Workers Union v. Exxon Co. 15 1 and the Sixth Circuit in Monroe Auto
Equipment Co. v. UAW, Local 878152 correctly interpreted the Misco Court's
reasoning behind the application of the public policy exception by applying the public policy exception to the employee's conduct and not the
actual act of reinstatement of the employee. 15 3 Misco's analysis focused on
whether reinstating an operator of dangerous machinery found under the
influence of drugs violated public policy, not if there was a public policy
against reinstating the employee. 15 4 The fact that the Home attempted to
extend the public policy exception to the reinstatement of Mr. Barron
149. See Misco, 484 U.S. at 44 (stating that Fifth Circuit's judgment is firmly
rooted in common sense and based on public policy considerations, but does not
allow for vacatur under public policy exception).
150. See id. (noting that Fifth Circuit failed to justify its public policy adequately). In Misco, the Supreme Court ruled that the arbitrator's award failed to
fall within the scope of the public policy exception for two reasons. See id. First,
the Supreme Court found that the award was based solely on "general considerations of supposed public interests" and was not based on a well-defined and dominant public policy derived from existing laws or precedent. See id. Second, the
award was deemed not to violate public policy because the Fifth Circuit assumed the
connection between the marijuana found in the employee's car and the actual use
of drugs in the workplace. See id. The Court held that "a refusal to enforce an
award must rest on more than speculation or assumption." Id.
151. 991 F.2d 244 (5th Cir.. 1993).
152. 981 F.2d 261 (6th Cir. 1992).
153. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen's Union, 993 F.2d 357, 360-64
(3d Cir. 1993) (finding that reinstatement of particular employee would violate
public policy, condone illegal activity and insufficiently deter drug use by other
employees in safety-sensitive jobs, and mentioning that there is no existence of
policy against reinstatement of employee who tested positive for drugs in safetysensitive position); Gulf Coast, 991 F.2d at 250-55 (establishing through federal statutes, state statutes, various regulations and judicial precedence that "well-defined
and dominant" public policy exists against drug use by employees in safety-sensitive
positions and violation of this policy enables courts to vacate arbitrator's award
under public policy exception); Monroe Auto Equip., 981 F.2d at 271 (Nelson, J.,
dissenting) (focusing on employee's conduct and finding that his marijuana use
while off duty did not violate policy where "[e]mployees will be subject to discharge [for] . . . [b]eing under the influence of alcohol or drugs on Company
property or on Company time").
154. See Misco, 484 U.S. at 44 (stating that formulation of public policy by
Fifth Circuit did not follow test that policy must evolve from reference to laws and
legal precedents rather than general considerations of public interests). The
Supreme Court in Misco stated that even if it accepted the formulation of public
policy against the operation of dangerous machinery while under the influence of
drugs, there was no connection between the drug-related incident and the use of
drugs in the workplace. See id. The Supreme Court's analysis dealt with the public
policy "against the operation of dangerous machinery by persons under the influence of alcohol," without making reference to the public policy against the reinstatement of one found operating dangerous machinery while under the influence
of drugs or alcohol. Id.
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should not change the scope of the analysis under Misco. 1 55 Therefore,
the Second Circuit, by finding the public policy exception inapplicable to
the enforcement of an arbitral award reinstating an employee found in
possession of marijuana with intent to distribute while on duty, incorrectly
interpreted the Misco Court's application of the public policy
56
exception.1
2.

Recognizing the Need for Deference

The Second Circuit correctly recognized that the "firmly-established,
legislatively-entrenched policy favoring resolution of labor disputes
through arbitration" limits the scope of the public policy exception.' 57 It
is not the job of the courts to second-guess the choice of the arbitrator or
to rewrite the collective bargaining agreement.1 58 Although the scope of
155. See Saint Mary Home, Inc. v. Service Employees Int'l Union, Dist. 1199,
116 F.3d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 1997) (discussing Home's argument).
156. See id. (recognizing public policy against use, possession and sale of
drugs, but not against reinstatement of employee arrested for offense on job). The
Second Circuit openly acknowledged that the evidence offered by the Home
"evinces a strong public policy against the use, possession and sale of drugs .... "
Id. Furthermore, unlike the situation in Misco, the marijuana was found in the
employee's possession while on duty, and therefore did not require the court to
assume the connection between the possession charge and the use of drugs at the
workplace. See id. at 42. "Typically, the public policy exception is implicated when
enforcement of the award compels one of the parties to take action which directly
conflicts with public policy." Brown v. Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc., 994 F.2d 775,
782 (11th Cir. 1993) (citing Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Airline Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 861
F.2d 665, 671 (11th Cir. 1988) (finding that enforcement of award violated public
policy because it required reinstatement of pilot who operated aircraft while
drunk)); Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Local Union 204 of the Int'l Bhd of Elec.
Workers, 834 F.2d 1424, 1428 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding that enforcement of award
reinstating nuclear power plant machinist who deliberately violated NRC rules violated public policy). Instead of focusing on the strong public policy that the Home
established against the use, possession and sale of drugs that applied to the arbitral
award in Mr. Barron's current situation, the Second Circuit incorrectly formulated
a much narrower interpretation of Misco and focused on whether the reinstatement
of Mr. Barron violated public policy. See Saint Mary Home, 116 F.3d at 46 (finding
that Home's public policy was too broad).
157. See Saint May Home, 116 F.3d at 45 (recognizing traditional policy of
deference in favor of arbitrator's award because parties bargained for it); see also
Misco, 484 U.S. at 36 ("The federal policy of settling labor disputes by arbitration
would be undermined if courts had the final say on the merits of the awards.");
Stead Motors v. Automotive Machinists Lodge No. 1173, 886 F.2d 1200, 1208 (9th
Cir. 1989) (finding that federal policy favoring resolution of labor disputes
through arbitration would be frustrated if courts had plenary authority over merits
of awards); Local Joint Executive Bd. v. Riverboat Casino, Inc., 817 F.2d 524, 52627 (9th Cir. 1987) (concluding that it is not role of courts to have final say regarding merits of arbitration case and that failure to limit judicial review to circumstances where awards would violate well-defined and dominant public policy would
result in undermining of federal policy of settling labor disputes through
arbitration).
158. See Saint Mary Home, 116 F.3d at 45 (noting that parties bargained for
arbitrator's decision, whether they agree with it or not, and that is what they received); see also Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. Transportation
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judicial review is designed to be narrow to limit intrusive review of arbitration awards, courts may and should refuse to enforce arbitral awards when
the enforcement of the award would violate a well-defined and dominant
pubic policy.

15 9

In Saint Mary Home, the Home clearly recognized the narrow scope of
judicial review under the public policy exception, but provided legislative,
regulatory and judicial materials supporting a public policy against drugrelated conduct in general. 160 The Third and Fifth Circuits have also recCommunications Int'l Union, 973 F.2d 276, 278 (4th Cir. 1992) ("Arbitration ... is
'the substitute for industrial strife' . . . [but] arbitration can succeed in achieving
these goals only to the extent it is accorded finality by the judiciary." (quoting
United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
578 (1960))); Shelby County Health Care Corp. v. American Fed. of State, County
& Mun. Employees, Local 1733, 967 F.2d 1091, 1094 (6th Cir. 1992) ("'If the
courts were free to intervene on these grounds, the speedy resolution of grievances
by private mechanisms would be greatly undermined .... .' (quoting Misco, 484
U.S. at 37-38)); Board of County Comm'rs v. L. Robert Kimball & Assoc., 860 F.2d
683, 685 (6th Cir. 1989) ("Once it is determined that a dispute should be referred
to arbitration

. .

. '[t] he courts are not authorized to reconsider the merits of an

award .... ' (quoting Misco, 484 U.S. at 36)); Florida Power Corp. v. International
Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local Union 433, 847 F.2d 680, 683 (11 th Cir. 1988) ("'The
court may not reevaluate supposed inconsistencies in the arbitrator's logic or review the merits of the arbitrator's decision."' (quoting Local 863 Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters v. Jersey Coast Egg Producers, Inc., 773 F.2d 530, 534 (3d Cir. 1985)));
American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Serv., 789 F.2d 1, 2-3 (D.C.
Cir. 1986) ("'[lit is the arbitrator's construction of the contract that the parties
bargained for and not that of the court, and it does not matter whether the court
disagrees with the arbitrator's judgment on the merits."' (quoting United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960))).
159. See Saint Mary Home, 116 F.3d at 46 (recognizing limited scope to reviewing arbitral awards, but allowing for vacatur of arbitrator's award when enforcement would be directly at odds with public policy); see also Newsday, Inc. v. Long
Island Typographical Union, No. 915, 915 F.2d 840, 844 (2d Cir. 1990) (acknowledging that courts have limited capacity to review arbitral awards, but may refuse
to enforce contracts that violate law or public policy); Amalgamated Meat Cutters
& Butcher Workmen, Local Union 540 v. Great W. Food Co., 712 F.2d 122, 124
(5th Cir. 1983) (stating that courts should exercise extreme caution before declaring that arbitral award violates public policy, but that courts may apply public policy exception to enforcement of arbitral awards when awards violate well-defined
and dominant public policy).
160. See Saint Mary Home, 116 F.3d at 46 (arguing that reinstatement of employee who engaged in drug-related conduct in workplace violates well-defined
and dominant pubic policy). For example, the Second Circuit cited a Connecticut
statute that provides penalties for illegal manufacture, distribution, sale, prescription and dispensing of dependency-producing drugs. See CONN. GEN. STAT.

§

21a-

277 (1994) (establishing penalties for offenses concerning dependency-producing
drugs). Moreover, this policy is particularly evident in the workplace. See Drug
Free Workplace Act of 1988, 41 U.S.C. §§ 701-707 (1994) (providing standards of
workplace conduct); Exec. Order No. 12564, 3 C.F.R. §§ 224-229 (1986), reprinted
in 5 U.S.C. § 7301 (1994) (promoting drug-free workplace); 10 C.F.R. §§ 707.1707.17 (1996) (establishing drug testing program for civilian employees of Department of Energy); 49 C.F.R. §§ 40.1-40.39 (1995) (establishing drug testing program for civilian employees of Department of Transportation); 48 C.F.R.
§§ 923.570-923.570-3 (1995) (providing drug testing regulations for Department of
Energy).
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ognized that similar drug-related employee behavior in the workplace violates a well-defined and dominant public policy. 6 ' In addition, the
Supreme Court in Misco stated that "[a] court's refusal to enforce an arbitrator's interpretationof a collective bargaining agreement is limited to situations where the contract as interpreted would violate 'some explicit
public policy' that is 'well-defined and dominant .... 162 The Supreme
Court concluded that this public policy may be "'ascertained by reference
to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of
supposed public interests.""1 63

Although the Second Circuit found a

strong public policy against the use, sale and possession of drugs, by not
following Misco and thereby improperly narrowing the public policy exception, the court upheld the arbitral award because it did not find such a
policy against reinstating an employee who was charged with marijuana
164
possession and intent to distribute.
3.

Safety-Sensitive Position: Nursing Fits the Bill

Under current law, a policy sufficient to vacate an arbitral award
under the public policy exception must be ascertained "'by reference to
... laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interests.""165 The Second Circuit recognized a line of cases
supporting a public policy against drug and alcohol use in safety-sensitive
positions in which the arbitrator's award ordering reinstatement of the
employee violated public policy, 1 66 Although the Second Circuit stated
161. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen's Union, 993 F.2d 357, 364 (3d
Cir. 1993) (holding that reinstating employee who tested positive for marijuana
would violate well-defined and dominant public policy against operation of vessels
by drug users); see also Gulf Coast Indus. Workers Union v. Exxon Co., 991 F.2d
244, 250-54 (5th Cir. 1993) (ruling that employee who violated company drug policy by testing positive for cocaine violated well-defined and dominant public policy
established by multiple federal and state statutes on elimination of drugs in workplace, regulations on control of alcohol and drug use in workplace, executive order for random testing and judicial decisions).
162. Misco, 484 U.S. at 43.
163. Id. at 30 (quoting W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int'l Union of
United Rubber, 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983)).
164. See Saint Mary Home, 116 F.3d at 46 (discussing materials presented by
Home establishing well-defined and dominant public policy against use, possession
and sale of drugs).
165. Id. (quoting Misco, 484 U.S. at 43).
166. See id. at 46-47 (supporting premise that awards mandating reinstatement of employees charged with drug and alcohol use in safety-sensitive positions
violates public policy). The Home cited numerous cases supporting this policy.
See id. (citing Union Pac. R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 3 F.3d 255, 261-62 (8th
Cir. 1993) (finding that reinstatement of railroad brakeman who tested positive for
drug use violated public policy against on-duty drug use as well as purpose of regulation, which is to prevent accidents and casualties in railroad operations that result from impairment of employees by alcohol or drugs); Exxon Shipping, 993 F.2d
at 360-62 (holding that arbitral award mandating reinstatement of helmsman, who
was terminated for testing positive for marijuana in violation of Coast Guard regulations, would undermine public policy efforts to keep individuals who test positive
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that the cases cited by the Home did not support their claim that the reinstatement of an employee in a sensitive nursing home context violates a
well-defined and dominant public policy, this conclusion is incorrectly
67
reasoned. 1
The Second Circuit, similar to the circuits cited by the Home, found
that there was clearly a strong public policy against the use, possession and
sale of drugs, as well as the reinstatement of an employee in a safety-sensitive position, which violated this policy. 168 Although the Home did not
cite cases or regulations prohibiting reinstatement after suspension of those
convicted of drug offenses in the health care industry, Mr. Barron clearly
was in a safety-sensitive position. 169 Although the Home may not have

been able to argue that Mr. Barron's responsibilities were comparable to
those of a physician or emergency technician, Mr. Barron, similar to members of those medical fields, was directly responsible for the livelihood and
well-being of his patients. 170 Like any ship's helmsperson, commercial airfor drugs from operating commercial vessels and would insufficiently deter drug
use in safety-sensitive positions); Gulf Coast, 991 F.2d at 255 (ruling that reinstatement of petro-chemical plant worker responsible for supply of electricity, steam,
water and nitrogen who tested positive for cocaine violated well-defined and dominant public policy established by countless governmental directives and judicial
decisions favoring drug-free and safe workplace); Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Air Line
Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 861 F.2d 665, 674 (11 th Cir. 1988) (stating that reinstatement of
pilot who operated passenger airliner while under influence of alcohol, endangering passengers and crew, violated clearly established public policy)).
167. See id. at 46 (rejecting Home's claim that reinstatement of Mr. Barron,
Certified Nursing Assistant, found in possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, violated well-defined and dominant public policy).
168. See id. at 46-47 (recognizing public policy against reinstatement of employee in safety-sensitive position who violated policy against drug and alcohol
use).

169. See id. at 47 (noting that health care profession is one of most heavily
regulated industries in country, but "[H]ome has cited neither case law nor regulations prohibiting reinstatement"). In response to a similar argument, the arbitrator in Saint Mary Home noted that the lack of an explicit policy does not preclude
the Home from disciplining an employee for just cause:
The Arbitrator therefore rules that, notwithstanding the sale or consumption of illegal drugs is not expressly prohibited by the plant rules, such
conduct constitutes criminal behavior, and is at variance with the proper
deportment of an employee in the context of the employment relationship. The Arbitrator concurs in the principal that "no specific rule is
necessary" to warrant a finding that discipline is warranted for illegal,
criminal activity on Company premises. Management is entitled to anticipate that its employees will be honest, punctual, sober, and refrain from
physical violence or destruction of company property. An employee who
violates his other obligations may be subject to discipline even though
such conduct is not expressly prohibited by plant rules.
See Brief for Appellant at app. 72, Saint Mary Home (No. 96-9353).
170. See Saint Mary Home, 116 F.3d at 47 (commenting on Home's failure to
make analogy between Mr. Barron's responsibilities at Home and those of other
employees within medical field); see also Brief for Appellant at 3, Saint Mary Home
(No. 96-9353) (discussing responsibilities of Mr. Barron as Certified Nursing Assistant at defendant's facility).
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line pilot or train brakeperson, Mr. Barron was directly responsible for the
lives of others. Because of his safety-sensitive position, an arbitral award
mandating the Home's reinstatement of Mr. Barron after he was found in
violation of a well-defined and dominant public policy against the use, possession and sale of drugs violates public policy.
V.

IMPACT

Under an analysis of the public policy exception to the enforcement
of arbitral awards, the Second Circuit should have held that an arbitral
award ordering the reinstatement of a health care employee found in pos171
session of marijuana with intent to distribute violated public policy.
The court should have 'recognized that the Supreme Court in Misco failed
to find the public policy exception applicable because of the employer's
inability to establish a well-defined and dominant pubic policy against the
employee's conduct, not due to the absence of a public policy against the
reinstatement of an employee whose conduct violated a well-defined and
dominant public policy.' 72 Moreover, after concluding that there was a
strong public policy against the use, possession and sale of drugs, the Second Circuit should have recognized that vacating the arbitral award on
public policy grounds would not be "in contravention of the well-established and dominant public policy supporting the validity of arbitral
73
awards based on . . . 'general considerations of public interest."1
The Second Circuit's decision will influence courts to continue to
apply an overly narrow approach to the public policy exception. In an
era of increased litigation, this narrow interpretation will undoubtedly
increase challenges under the public policy exception. 174 The Second
171. For a discussion and analysis of the application of the pubic policy exception under Misco, see supra notes 148-56 and accompanying text.
172. For a discussion of the Second Circuit's application of the public policy
exception to the enforcement of arbitral awards formulated in Misco, see supra
notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
173. See Saint Mary Home, 116 F.3d at 47 (quoting Misco, 484 U.S. at 43). The
Second Circuit found that the material cited by the Home "evinces a strong public
policy against the use, possession and sale of drugs." Id. The Home tried to establish a much narrower policy, "a policy against the reinstatement of a long-term
employee after a seven-month suspension without pay or benefits following an
arrest for possession with intent to sell marijuana," but the court found it was unsuccessful. See id. Accordingly, the court held that Mr. Barron's behavior does
violate the broader public policy acknowledged by it. See id.
174. See Galbraith, supra note 2, at 241-42 (stating that not all who participated in arbitration process would view arbitration as panacea to immense overcrowding of federal courts because of challenges to arbitral awards in federal
courts stemming from one party's dissatisfaction with arbitrator's interpretation of
collective bargaining agreement). Since the Supreme Court decided the Steelworkers Trilogy, there have been at least 1602 federal district and circuit court
appeals from the arbitral process. See LeRoy & Feuille, supra note 3, at 78 (noting
impact of arbitral proceedings on litigation levels in federal district and circuit
courts).
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Circuit's decision in Saint Mary Home does nothing to alleviate these
75

challenges. 1

Recognizing that the health care industry is one of the most regulated
industries, this narrow application of the public policy exception not only
violates the strong public policy aimed at eradicating the use, possession
and sale of illegal drugs, but also results in a seemingly impenetrable barrier for employers who want to comply with drug and drug-related legislation. 176 Realizing that in choosing to submit' disputes to arbitration
parties bargain for an arbitrator's decision, courts should protect the public interest and vacate arbitral awards that contravene a well-defined and
dominant public policy.' 77 Ultimately, a case like Saint Mary Home will
arise again for review in front of the federal district courts, circuit courts
or even the Supreme Court.' 78 In view of the overly narrow application of
the public policy exception by the Second Circuit in Saint Mary Home,
courts should realize that while there are times for deference to the arbitrator's award, sometimes, in an effort to protect that principle, they have
failed to recognize the proper scope of the public policy exception.
Scott Barbakoff

175. For a discussion of the Second Circuit's decision in Saint Mary Home and
the interpretation and application of the public policy exception, see supra notes
145-70 and accompanying text.
176. See Saint Mary Home, 116 F.3d at 45 (refusing to extend public policy
exception where employer establishes strong public policy against "on-the-job
drug-related offenses"). This type of extremely narrow application of the public
policy exception illustrates the same reason that the Eleventh Circuit refused to
adopt the "manifest disregard" threshold for the application of the public policy
exception. See Galbraith, supra note 2, at 254 (noting that Eleventh Circuit refused
to take such narrow interpretation of public policy exception because it would
likely never be met).
177. For a discussion of the grounds for vacatur of an arbitral award under
the public policy exception, see supra notes 22-35 and accompanying text.
178. See First Nat'l Supermarkets, Inc. v. Retail, Wholesale & Chain Store
Food Employees Union Local 338, 118 F.3d 892, 896-98 (2d Cir. 1997) (debating
proper scope of public policy exception). In First National Supermarkets, an employer brought an action to vacate an arbitral award requiring reinstatement of an
employee who came to work under the influence of alcohol and drugs and was
unable to perform his duties. See id. at 893-94. Although the employee was not
employed in a safety-sensitive field, the Second Circuit nevertheless held that there
was no established policy requiring the permanent discharge of an employee who
was found in possession of marijuana with the intent to sell on his or her employer's premises. See id. at 897-98 (citing Saint Mary Home, 116 F.3d at 46). This
overly narrow approach once again disregarded the court's acknowledgment of a
strong public policy embedded in state and federal laws favoring workplace safety
and against the use, possession and sale of controlled substances. See id. at 897
(noting employer's argument regarding state and federal concerns over drug use
in workplace).
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